Entry: U.S. EXCLUSIVE! IRAN & SYRIA SPLIT! Wednesday, February 21, 2007



IRAN AND SYRIA SPLIT!, AMERICAN EXCLUSIVE: INSIDE AL QAEDA'S SECRET WORLD- HOW AL QAEDA USES PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE!
 

Iran is Now Accepting a Temporary Suspension of Enrichment

A few days before the U.N. Security Council discussion on widening the sanctions against Iran under UNSC Resolution No. 1737, which was scheduled for February 13, 2007, [1] there are signs of an Iranian retreat in the face of Saudi, U.S., and European pressures regarding its uranium enrichment. The following is a review of these signs:

A) Iranian Foreign Relations Steering Council member Ali Akbar Velayati, who is international affairs advisor to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, left for Moscow on February 7 with a positive response to Russian President Vladimir Putin's recommendation that Iran's leaders accept the ElBaradei proposal under which Iranwould freeze its uranium enrichment in exchange for a freeze on sanctions against it. [2] In addition, on February 14, 2007, Velayati said, on the issue of a freeze on uranium enrichment, that "there is no idea that cannot from the outset be considered." [3]

B) Iran's Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, who is in charge of Iran's nuclear dossier, said "the proposals based on us activating centrifuges in such a way that uranium enrichment will be in minimal quantities can be an opening point." [4]

C) On February 12, 2007, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mohammad Ali Husseini announced that "Iranis considering all the issues, even freezing [uranium enrichment], as worthy of examination in the framework of negotiations." [5] At the same time, Husseini announced on February 13, 2007 that Iran would never accept the demand to freeze uranium enrichment as a precondition for negotiations. [6]

D) On February 9, 2007, Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Member Dariush Qanbari said that Iran was willing to partially freeze uranium enrichment, "as a goodwill [gesture]... A temporary freeze under the current conditions in order to gain the trust of the European side and the UNSC members is the best way to solve the nuclear crisis..." [7]

E) On February 8, the Baztab website, which is affiliated with Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Rezai and considered to be in the camp of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, reported that there was a possibility that Iran would freeze uranium enrichment for two months: "[Towards the UNSC discussion on the continued handling of the nuclear crisis], commentators anticipate three possible scenarios. The first is an examination of the ElBaradei proposal... The second is... the continued implementation of Resolution 1737, where instead of issuing a resolution on additional sanctions... the negotiations between Iran and Europe will continue in order to arrive at a possible outcome. But the third scenario, that has a greater chance of acceptance by both sides, is a return to the previous 11-section agreement between [E.U. Foreign Policy chiefJavier] Solana and [Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali] Larijani, and the addition of a 12th section that stipulates that when the 11 sections mentioned by the 5+1 countries are signed, Iran will implement a two-month freeze on uranium enrichment..." [8]

F) President Ahmadinejad's further postponement of a long-promised speech revealing Iran's nuclear achievements. [9] (News on this issue is now promised to be released occasionally until April 9, 2007.)

G) In addition, senior Iranian officials made statements in favor of negotiating with the U.S. On February 11, Iranian Expediency Council Chairman Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani said, "It would be effective for us to negotiate [with the U.S.], but [at the same time preserving Iran's] honor." [10]

Khamenei-Ahmadinejad Rift Widens

Against the backdrop of the need to respond to the Saudi, European, and international pressures, there are signs of a widening of the internal rift between Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad.

Evidence of this widening can be found, for example, in the Baztab website's repeated attacks on Ahmadinejad's policy, and, on the other hand, in the banning of the website by Iran's Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, on charges that it was harming the state by disseminating despair and pessimism among the people about the legitimacy and effectiveness of the regime, insulting judiciary figures and regime officials, and spreading lies and slander. [11]

At the same time, President Ahmadinejad and top Iranian officials are issuing statements that Iran will not freeze its uranium enrichment. Thus, for example, on February 11, 2007, Ahmadinejad declared, during celebrations marking the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, that "the Iranian people will never agree to such a disgrace." [12]

Iranian Threats Against the U.S. Continue

In a speech marking the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohamed Najar stated, "Thanks to God and to the efforts of the Iranian experts, we are today at a stage where we can produce all our armed forces' needs [by ourselves] within Iran... Even though, for security reasons and in order to prevent the enemy from exploiting [the information] we cannot publish our [military] achievements, the production of various anti-missile missiles and of surface-to-surface missiles with warheads for various uses and a 2,000 km range are only a small part of our defense capabilities..." [13]

On February 10, 2007, Iranian Revolutionary Guards Commander Yahya Rahim Safavi told Al-'Alam TV that Iran had constructed an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with a range of 700 km which is already in operational use. Safavi added that Iran was independently manufacturing ballistic missiles with a range of 2,000 km. He said, "The aim in building the UAV was operational aerial photography, intelligence gathering, and sending images, but using it we can find out about the size of the bases, about the destroyers, and about the location of the enemy in the region, and based on this can make [attack] plans... This kind of UAV is... invisible to radar and also cannot easily be intercepted... The UAV has passed the test stage and is now on the mass production line, and we can even [already] use it for operational needs..."

Safavi continued, "Twenty-eight years after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, and particularly after the experienced acquired during eight years of war against Iraq [1980-88], Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces has attained the [capability] to independently produce various types of missiles, including surface-to-surface missiles, long-range missiles, ballistic missiles with a range of 2,000 km, and land-to-sea missiles... [Also], Iran's Ministry of Defense has been successful in building a satellite, but we need assistance from one of the neighboring countries to launch it..." [14]

Deputy commander of the land forces of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Nour Ali Shoushtari said, at a conference commemorating the fallen in the Iran-Iraq war, that "Iran has built UAVs which can, if necessary, carry out suicide operations at any depth against the American destroyers so that they will leave the [Persian Gulf] region shamefacedly... If Bush wants to act logically, he must remove his forces from the region so that calm will prevail... If necessary, the atmosphere for these destroyers can be made insecure... The Americans know that in the event of confrontation with the Islamic regime, security will not prevail - not only not in the [Gulf] region, but also not in their country..." [15]

Commenting on military maneuvers conducted by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps in the Persian Gulf, deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards Navy Admiral Ali Fadavi declared that "the SSN4 strategic anti-destroyer missiles, with a maximum range of 350 km... cover the region of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, and extensive parts of the northern Indian Ocean... The advanced momentum system of the SSN4 cruise missiles, which can fly low above the water, strengthens them against electronic warfare; this missile's 500-kg warhead can harm and eliminate destroyers..." [16]

The deputy of the Majlis Committee for National Security and Foreign Policy, Mohamed Nabi Rodaki, threatened that "the U.S. must release, as quickly as possible, the Iranian diplomats, and must obey the international laws on diplomatic immunity... because otherwise the blood of the American diplomats will be subject to kidnapping..." [17]

In a February 12, 2007 analysis, Sobh-e Sadeq, the mouthpiece of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei circulated among the Revolutionary Guards, wrote in an analysis titled "No Target is Out of Missile Range": In the event of direct confrontation of any kind, we will light the fire of Hell in the American military camps within a radius of several thousand kilometers [from Iran]." [18]

* Y. Mansharof is a research fellow at MEMRI
http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=IA32707

Islamists have long used jihad films of real or staged attacks against the Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan in their persistent efforts to disparage claims by the U.S. and its allies that they are winning the war on terror. A film recently posted on the Islamist websites may serve as a transparent example of how the mujahideen stage an attack in order to intensify their psychological warfare against the Coalition forces, and possibly against the Western public as well.

Below is a brief description of the film, followed by a list of features that raise doubts as to the authenticity of the attack.

The 24-minute film, titled "Capture of an American Post, Arghandab, Zabul Province," was posted on Islamist websites February 16, 2007. [1] Dated Muharram 1428 (January-February 2007), the film bears the logo of Al-Qaeda's media production company Al-Sahab. It shows the mujahideen carrying out a reconnaissance mission prior to the attack. Using a sand model of the target, they plan a coordinated attack against two military compounds. The mujahideen are shown marching towards the target, positioning themselves for attack, and, after carrying out the night attack and "liberating" the army post, returning to their home-base. The film then shows footage of the "liberated" compound following the attack, as well as images of locals praising the mujahideen for driving the Americans away.

Following are some aspects of the film which raise doubts as to the authenticity of the attack:

1. Al-Sahab films usually indicate the exact date of the attack, while this film gives the month (Muharram), and not the exact day.

2. The two compounds shown in the video, which the narrator claims are occupied by U.S. and Afghani troops, show no clear signs of military presence, whether U.S. or any other.

3. The mujahideen are seen walking towards the target in broad daylight, crossing an open area which offers no possibility of concealment, while U.S. helicopters supposedly circle overhead.

4. Unlike other videos showing night attacks, in which mujahideen are seen running and shooting through the dark, nothing is seen here of the attack except flashes of mortar launches and tracers.

5. The mujahideen in this video are not shown looting the compounds and setting them on fire, unlike in other attack videos, in which successful raids are immediately followed by looting and burning.

6. Despite the extensive nature of the attack, in which 150 mujahideen supposedly participated, and despite the supposed direct confrontation with the Americans and Afghans, the narrator reports no casualties on either side.

7. The alleged post-attack images of the compounds, which were clearly taken in daylight (and not immediately following the night attack), suggest that the location was deserted. For example, the film shows no clear signs of a hasty retreat by the Americans (e.g. abandoned equipment).

8. Background noises suggest that some segments of the soundtrack were superimposed on the video. For example, the pre-attack footage, supposedly taken by the reconnaissance team, is accompanied by the voice of one of its members, who speaks quietly when describing the target, as if to avoid detection by the Americans. However, voices of children playing nearby can be heard - although the reconnaissance team seems to have been positioned on an isolated hill overlooking the compounds.


Below are images from the film:

 

Alongside military jihad on various battlefields, Islamist organizations are engaged in another type of warfare: jihad on the media front. The media is viewed by Islamist organizations both as an important battlefield and as an effective tool, and they consequently make extensive use of it.

The media platform favored by the Islamist organizations is the Internet, which they prefer for several reasons: firstly, for the anonymity it allows - anyone can enter and post to a site without divulging personal information; secondly, due to the medium's availability and low cost - all that is required is a PC and an Internet connection; and thirdly, due to the ability to distribute material to a great number of people over a wide geographic area in a matter of seconds.

The organizations use the Internet mainly for propaganda and indoctrination, but also for operational military needs.

This paper will discuss the distinguishing characteristics of the websites of Islamist organizations and their supporters; the various online activities through which terrorist organizations assist the mujahideen on the ground, both militarily and, especially, with propaganda; and the Internet polemics that these organizations conduct vis-à-vis their enemies. [1]

The Internet in the Service of Islamist Organizations

*Main Characteristics of Islamist Websites

Islamist websites operate out of various countries, both Muslim and non-Muslim, and their target audience includes countries and communities all over the world. Accordingly, the websites address their audiences in various languages, from Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, and Turkish to Western languages such as English and French.

Some websites have versions in different languages, both Eastern and Western. Examples are the unofficial Hamas site, www.palestine-info.co.uk, and the site of the British organization Supporters of Shari'a (http://www.supportersofshariah.com ), which was headed by Abu Hamza Al-Masri, who is currently serving a prison sentence in London. It is noteworthy, however, that the different versions do not carry the same content, since they are aimed at different audiences.

Islamist sites tend to be transitory and impermanent - new sites appear and others close down or are shut down on a daily basis. An example is the Islamist forum Al-Qal'a (http://www.qal3ati.com ), once popular and active, which was shut down after it posted the statement taking responsibility for the July 2005 London bombings. Sites also frequently change their URLs, as in the case of the unofficial Hamas site www.palestine-info.info (previously www.palestine-info.co.uk and www.palestine-info.com ).

*Most Islamist Websites Hosted in the West

Islamist organizations utilize the services of Western Internet companies and exploit Western freedom of speech in spreading their message. Most Islamist websites are hosted by servers in the West, and some are even registered there. A 2004 MEMRI review of Islamic sites (published as a two-part report titled "Islamist Websites and their Hosts") found that most of the sites used servers of Western companies. [2]

*Islamist Organizations' Use of Internet Services

Islamist organizations and their supporters use of all the usual Internet services, including websites, forums, and discussion groups. According to some media reports, they also use the Internet for communications, instead of telephones and land mail.

Websites

Official websites of Islamist organizations:

The Islamists' basic use of the Internet is the establishment and operation of websites through which they disseminate their messages. Some Islamist organizations maintain official websites, established by the organization and run by individuals with ties to the organization. It is not always possible to know for certain whether a given website is indeed an official one, but from the website's contents it can often be understood that those running it have direct ties to top organization officials. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, many Iraqi terrorist organizations fighting against the Coalition forces have set up official websites. Examples are the site of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), an umbrella organization of several Sunni Iraqi terrorist groups led by Al-Qaeda in Iraq (http://islamiciraq.modawanati.com ), and the site of the Islamic Army in Iraq (www.iaisite.org ) - the largest organization that has not joined the ISI. (http://islamiciraq.modawanati.com ).

Official websites of religious scholars supporting the Islamist organizations:

Another category is websites of religious scholars who play an active role in setting up the organizations' ideological infrastructure, and in granting religious-legal legitimacy to their activities. Many of these religious scholars are currently serving prison sentences for incitement to terrorism or even for active involvement in terrorism - but this does not prevent them from spreading incitement and supporting terrorism via their websites, which remain active. An example is the website of the Jordanian Sheikh Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi (www.almaqdese.net ), who was the spiritual mentor of former Al-Qaeda in Iraq commander Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi. The name of Al-Maqdisi's site is Minbar Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad (The Podium of Monotheism and Jihad), which is reminiscent of the original name of Al-Zarqawi's organization, initially called Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad (The Monotheism and Jihad Group). Al-Maqdisi's website contains numerous writings that provide ideological and religious-legal legitimacy for many Islamist terrorist organizations. [3]

Unofficial websites supporting the organizations: 

MUCH MORE INFO HERE:  http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=IA32807

A recent discussion on an Islamist forum reflected Islamists' growing concern over the threat posed to their websites by Western intelligence agencies, and over the danger of exposure mujahideen face when online. Forum participants suggested various strategies for ensuring the circulation of Islamist materials and for protecting the Islamists' online anonymity.

The following are the main points of the discussion:

Addressing the issue of the threat to Islamist websites, one of the forum participants wrote: "We are all aware of the Zionist-Crusader campaign that has been launched against the Islamist websites... The most recent [manifestation of this campaign] is... the effort of American intelligence to completely eliminate websites that distribute communiqués [by the mujahideen] and films [documenting] attacks of the Iraqi resistance, or which encourage so-called terrorism.... As part of this campaign, [the Americans also] threaten TV networks that broadcast videos [documenting] attacks... or that report [Coalition] casualties not reported by the U.S. military."

To safeguard the distribution of jihad-related materials, the forum participants suggested posting them on multiple sites, both jihadist and non-jihadist, thus making them more difficult for U.S. authorities to remove. The participants compiled a list of suggested sites, and, in order to keep it out of the hands of non-Islamists, proposed that the list be posted on a special site and the URL sent to the mujahideen in private messages.

Regarding the danger of discovery by intelligence agencies, a participant wrote: "The various intelligence agencies have realized the significance of [the jihad websites and forums] and have seized upon them as an opportunity... to hunt down 'terrorists'... The [agencies] attempt to infiltrate the forums and plant their own [agents] in them, in order to [detect the terrorists] or in order to pressure the website owners into cooperating with them in this matter..."

Several suggestions were made for minimizing this danger, including tips on maintaining anonymity when posting and reading material and when communicating with other forum members. One writer, for example, reminded mujahideen that not all forum participants were authentic Islamists, so identifying information should never be revealed. Participants cited a number of messages posted on Islamist websites which they suspected of being "bait," surmising that the messages had been placed by agents posing as Islamists in an attempt to win the trust of forum participants, with the aim of getting them to cooperate with the agent offline and thus expose themselves.

Mujahideen were advised to be wary when posting jihad-related materials at Internet cafés, since "many of [these cafés] spy on their own customers, especially [those] with a Muslim appearance," and since their servers are insufficiently secure and easily accessed by intelligence agencies. They were also advised to avoid using Internet cafés near their homes.

Another recommendation was to provide false information when registering on jihad websites, since the servers of these websites could be hacked by intelligence agencies. It was pointed out that using the same user name and password on all Islamist websites could jeopardize the user's anonymity. Users were also advised to suspect every downloadable file being circulated on the forums, because some contained spyware.

The discussion also focused on common software and built-in computer tools to protect online anonymity. For example, members were advised to use proxy sites when accessing forums, to configure browsers to block "cookies," to empty the "Temporary Internet Files" and "History" folders each time they closed their browsers, and not to save encrypted pages to disk. They were further told to use anti-spyware programs and various other tools available to the general community of users.
http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD146207

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