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Thursday, November 25, 2004
Secrets Of History- Was Hitler Left- Or Right Wing?

WAS HITLER A SOCIALIST? WHAT ARE THE ROOTS OF MUSSOLINI'S FASCISM?
A friend and I were recently arguing over Hitler's movement being leftist. (The common lie is that he was a right winger- like a right winger will support guarenteed full employment, government paid vacations and free health care!) Thousands of Communists and socialists in Germany joined Hitler's SA during the Stalin- Hitler peace pact (the real reason there was no Marxist resistence to Hitler in Germany). In America, the Communist Party USA displayed pictures of Hitler at their rallies and wrote articles in the paper, THE DAILY WORKER praising Hitler's "unique historical German perspective on Marxism".
 
Why has this been lost in history? How many who think they are leftist, in fact, support the very same things the German people did in the 1930's?

QUOTE FROM LAST ARTICLE BELOW:
Fascism and Nazism modelled their methods on Lenin and Stalin and that the Fascist idea of adding nationalism to socialism was later taken up by Stalin and Mao -- so that in the end Fascism and Communism were two very similar Leftist sects. So the idea that Nazism and Fascism were Rightist is an old Soviet lie that Left-leaning intellectuals in the West have perpetuated in flagrant denial of historical reality.
 
 
 

"We are socialists, we are enemies of today's capitalistic economic system for the exploitation of the economically weak, with its unfair salaries, with its unseemly evaluation of a human being according to wealth and property instead of responsibility and performance, and we are all determined to destroy this system under all conditions." --Adolf Hitler

(Speech of May 1, 1927. Quoted by Toland, 1976, p. 306)


[Below is the 25 of the NSDAP Program - This is basically the National Socialist German Workers Party Platform. It included measures that in effect would redistribute income and war profits, profit-sharing with large industries, nationalization of trusts, extensive development of old-age pension (just like FDRs Social Security Program), and free education. Clearly this demonstrates Hitler was indeed a left winger and here is startling proof.]


The 25 points of the NSDAP Program were composed by Adolf Hitler and Anton Drexler. They were publically presented on 24 February 1920 "to a crowd of almost two thousand and every single point was accepted amid jubilant approval." (Mein Kampf, Volume II, Chapter I) Hitler explained their purpose in the fifth chapter of the second volume of Mein Kampf:

[T]he program of the new movement was summed up in a few guiding principles, twenty-five in all. They were devised to give, primarily to the man of the people, a rough picture of the movement's aims. They are in a sense a political creed, which on the one hand recruits for the movement and on the other is suited to unite and weld together by a commonly recognized obligation those who have been recruited.

Hitler was intent on having a community of mutual interest that desired mutual success instead of one that was divided over the control of money or differing values.

THE COMMON INTEREST BEFORE SELF-INTEREST -
THAT IS THE SPIRIT OF THE PROGRAM. BREAKING OF THE THRALDOM OF INTEREST - THAT IS THE KERNEL OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM.

In these straightforward statements of intent, Hitler translated his ideology into a plan of action which would prove its popularity with the German people throughout the coming years. For many, the abruptness of its departure from the tradition of politics as practiced in the western world was as much of a shock as its liberal nature and foresight of the emerging problems of western democracy.


 The Programme of the German Workers' Party is designed to be of limited duration. The leaders have no intention, once the aims announced in it have been achieved, of establishing fresh ones, merely in order to increase, artificially, the discontent of the masses and so ensure the continued existence of the Party.

1. We demand the union of all Germany in a Greater Germany on the basis of the right of national self-determination.

2. We demand equality of rights for the German people in its dealings with other nations, and the revocation of the peace treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain.

3. We demand land and territory (colonies) to feed our people and to settle our surplus population.

4. Only members of the nation may be citizens of the State. Only those of German blood, whatever be their creed, may be members of the nation. Accordingly, no Jew may be a member of the nation.

5. Non-citizens may live in Germany only as guests and must be subject to laws for aliens.

6. The right to vote on the State's government and legislation shall be enjoyed by the citizens of the State alone. We demand therefore that all official appointments, of whatever kind, whether in the Reich, in the states or in the smaller localities, shall be held by none but citizens.

We oppose the corrupting parliamentary custom of filling posts merely in accordance with party considerations, and without reference to character or abilities.

7. We demand that the State shall make it its primary duty to provide a livelihood for its citizens. If it should prove impossible to feed the entire population, foreign nationals (non-citizens) must be deported from the Reich.

8. All non-German immigration must be prevented. We demand that all non-Germans who entered Germany after 2 August 1914 shall be required to leave the Reich forthwith.

9. All citizens shall have equal rights and duties.

10. It must be the first duty of every citizen to perform physical or mental work. The activities of the individual must not clash with the general interest, but must proceed within the framework of the community and be for the general good.

We demand therefore:


11. The abolition of incomes unearned by work.

The breaking of the slavery of interest


12. In view of the enormous sacrifices of life and property demanded of a nation by any war, personal enrichment from war must be regarded as a crime against the nation. We demand therefore the ruthless confiscation of all war profits.

13. We demand the nationalization of all businesses which have been formed into corporations (trusts).

14. We demand profit-sharing in large industrial enterprises.

15. We demand the extensive development of insurance for old age.

16. We demand the creation and maintenance of a healthy middle class, the immediate communalizing of big department stores, and their lease at a cheap rate to small traders, and that the utmost consideration shall be shown to all small traders in the placing of State and municiple orders.

17. We demand a land reform suitable to our national requirements, the passing of a law for the expropriation of land for communal purposes without compensation; the abolition of ground rent, and the prohibition of all speculation in land. *

18. We demand the ruthless prosecution of those whose activities are injurious to the common interest. Common criminals, usurers, profiteers, etc., must be punished with death, whatever their creed or race.

19. We demand that Roman Law, which serves a materialistic world order, be replaced by a German common law.

20. The State must consider a thorough reconstruction of our national system of education (with the aim of opening up to every able and hard-working German the possibility of higher education and of thus obtaining advancement). The curricula of all educational establishments must be brought into line with the requirements of practical life. The aim of the school must be to give the pupil, beginning with the first sign of intelligence, a grasp of the nation of the State (through the study of civic affairs). We demand the education of gifted children of poor parents, whatever their class or occupation, at the expense of the State.

21. The State must ensure that the nation's health standards are raised by protecting mothers and infants, by prohibiting child labor, by promoting physical strength through legislation providing for compulsory gymnastics and sports, and by the extensive support of clubs engaged in the physical training of youth.

22. We demand the abolition of the mercenary army and the foundation of a people's army.

23. We demand legal warfare on deliberate political mendacity and its dissemination in the press. To facilitate the creation of a German national press we demand:

(a) that all editors of, and contributors to newspapers appearing in the German language must be members of the nation;
(b) that no non-German newspapers may appear without the express permission of the State. They must not be printed in the German language;
(c) that non-Germans shall be prohibited by law from participating financially in or influencing German newspapers, and that the penalty for contravening such a law shall be the suppression of any such newspaper, and the immediate deportation of the non-Germans involved.

The publishing of papers which are not conducive to the national welfare must be forbidden. We demand the legal prosecution of all those tendencies in art and literature which corrupt our national life, and the suppression of cultural events which violate this demand.

24. We demand freedom for all religious denominations in the State, provided they do not threaten its existence not offend the moral feelings of the German race.

The Party, as such, stands for positive Christianity, but does not commit itself to any particular denomination. It combats the Jewish-materialistic spirit within and without us, and is convinced that our nation can achieve permanent health only from within on the basis of the principle: The common interest before self-interest.

25. To put the whole of this programme into effect, we demand the creation of a strong central state power for the Reich; the unconditional authority of the political central Parliament over the entire Reich and its organizations; and the formation of Corporations based on estate and occupation for the purpose of carrying out the general legislation passed by the Reich in the various German states.

The leaders of the Party promise to work ruthlessly -- if need be to sacrifice their very lives -- to translate this programme into action.

Source: Programme of the NSDAP

 
 
 

Description: The author focuses on the main Nazi work creation programs like motorization, Autobahn, emergency relief, and rearmament. He stresses on the fact that most work creation from the period 1933-1936 was not a result of rearmament rather a fierce attack on employment through some of the methods mentioned above. In addition, the growing control of the Nazi party over all aspects of the economy is clearly identified in every chapter as this control grows. The book is loaded with information.

Professor Silverman argues, as a result of impressive research in Nazi archives, that it was work creation programs that account for this "miracle" and it was the 4-year Plan announced in 1936 that represented an emphasis on autarky and arms and a seller's market. Plans called for motorization and the famous autobahns. It is natural to compare Hitler's achievements with FDR's New Deal. Strangely Silverman hardly mention the USSR as a source of ideas in the Hitler years, though the 4-year Plan itself was inspired by the Soviet FYP, the second of which was being completed by the time Goebbels began administering the German equivalent. Earlier (February,1935) Soviet-type "work books" necessary for employment were introduced.


Hitler was named "Man of the Year" in 1938 by Time Magazine. They noted Hitler's anti-capitalistic economic policies:

"Most cruel joke of all, however, has been played by Hitler & Co. on those German capitalists and small businessmen who once backed National Socialism as a means of saving Germany's bourgeois economic structure from radicalism. The Nazi credo that the individual belongs to the state also applies to business. Some businesses have been confiscated outright, on other what amounts to a capital tax has been levied. Profits have been strictly controlled. Some idea of the increasing Governmental control and interference in business could be deduced from the fact that 80% of all building and 50% of all industrial orders in Germany originated last year with the Government. Hard-pressed for food- stuffs as well as funds, the Nazi regime has taken over large estates and in many instances collectivized agriculture, a procedure fundamentally similar to Russian Communism."

(Source: Time Magazine; Jaunuary 2, 1939.)


Hitler setup the Labour Front. Both employers and employees joined it. According to the National Labour Law of January 20, 1934, the state would exert direct influence and control over all business employing more than twenty persons. In other words, both employers and employees were put under the control of the government.  


 

Summary: Below is a short economic analysis of German Economy under the Nazis. It is apparent they ran a centralized collectivist economy just like the Soviet Union. It was a political party that acted much in the same way the American Left does in regard to unemployment and trying to use the government to decrease it. It notes that the Nazis used public works to a large extent, which is exceedingly leftist, and put people to work for the State.

The Nazis started enacting other leftist ploys like price freezes and starting expanding the role of the government and destroying any freedom left in the Market. Private Property owners were dictated to by the State. Clearly Nazis were opponents of capitalism through and through.

 

Notes on: "On the Theory of the Centrally Administered Economy: An Analysis of the German Experiment," by Walter Eucken

Walter Eucken was a professor of economics at the University of Freiburg, Germany and an architect of the economic reforms that led to the Economic Miracle. In this article Eucken wanted to explain the problems and weaknesses of centrally administered economies such as that of National Socialist (Nazi) Germany and the Soviet Union.

The Nazi economic system developed unintentionally. The initial objective in 1932-33 of its economic policy was just to reduce the high unemployment associated with the Great Depression. This involved public works, expansion of credit, easy monetary policy and manipulation of exchange rates. Generally Centrally Administered Economies (CAE's) have little trouble eliminating unemployment because they can create large public works projects and people are put to work regardless of whether or not their productivity exceeds their wage cost. Nazi Germany was successful in solving the unemployment problem, but after a few years the expansion of the money supply was threatening to create inflation.

The Nazi Government reacted to the threat of inflation by declaring a general price freeze in 1936. From that action the Nazi Government was driven to expand the role of the government in directing the economy and reducing the role played by market forces. Although private property was not nationalized, its use was more and more determined by the government rather than the owners.

Eucken uses the case of the leather industry. An individual leather factory produces at the direction of the Leather Control Office. This Control Office arranged for the factory to get the hides and other supplies it needed to produce leather. The output of leather was disposed of according to the dictates of the Leather Control Office. The Control Offices set their directives through a process involving four stages:

  • 1. The collection of statistical information by a Statistical Section. The Statistical Section tried to assemble all the important data on past production, equipment, storage facilities and raw material requirements.
  • 2. The planning of production taking into account the requirements of leather by other industries in their plans; e.g. the needs of the Shoe Control Office for supplies of leather. The available supply of hides limited the production of leather. There had to be a balancing of supply and demand. The result of the planning of all the control offices was a Balance Sheet. There was some effort at creating some system for solving the planning, such as production being limited by the narrowest bottleneck, but in practice the planning ended up being simply scaling up past production and planning figures.
  • 3. The issuing of production orders to the individual factories.
  • 4. Checking up on compliance with the planning orders.

In practice the authorities of the control offices often intervened and there was continual negotiation and political battles as the users of products tried to use political influence to improve their allocations. The prices of 1936 made little economic sense, particularly after Germany was at war. So there economic calculations using the official prices were meaningless. In particular, the profitability of a product was of no significance in determining whether it should be produced or not. Losses did not result in a factory ceasing production; the control offices made sure that it got the raw materials and that the workers got rations of necessities.

At the beginning of the war the Government established a priorities list for allocating scarse resources. Activities associated with the war got top priority and consumer goods production was near the bottom of the list. If two users wanted gasoline any available stocks went to the user with the highest priority. This seems reasonable but, in fact, it led to major problems. Suppose one use of gasoline is for trucks to haul raw materials to factories. If the Government always gives the available gasoline to the Army then the truckers cannot deliver supplies to the factories and they shut down and eventually other factories dependent upon them also shut down. At first the Government tried to handle the problem by revising the priorities list and moving up uses such as gasoline for trucks. But whatever uses got put at the bottom eventually created bottlenecks. In the middle of the war the Government abolished the priority list. It was an unworkable system.

The problem with making production decisions without reference to relevant prices is that the control offices may dictate the production of goods which are of less value to the economy than the opportunity costs of the resources that go into their production.

Because of the mistakes and failures of Centrally Administered Economies there are often black markets operating. Although the authorities typically persecute people for dealing in these markets the reality is that such markets are essential for preventing a collapse of the Centrally Administered Economy.

Production decisions may be made on political criteria that are economically foolish, such as locating a factory in a region to benefit the supporters of some political figure. Even aside from such corruption of the decision process the centrally administered economy suffers from major weaknesses. The centrally administered economy can mobilize resourts quickly for big investment projects but there is no guarantee that there will be a balance of investments. For example, there may be big programs to build railroads but not enough trains to make use of those railroads.

Although Centrally Administered Economies may appear to be efficient and effective initially their errors and inefficiencies accumulate and eventually result in stagnation if not collapse. Often the apparent successes of such economies are just illusions. Outsiders who do not know how such economies really work are often fooled by these illusions.

Source: San José State University - Department of Economics

MODERN LEFTISM AS RECYCLED FASCISM



By: John J. Ray (M.A.; Ph.D.)


Mussolini's own summary of the Fascist philosophy: "Tutto nello Stato, niente al di fuori dello Stato, nulla contro lo Stato" (Everything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State)


A Leftist prophet

The ideas of Benito Mussolini (1883-1945), the founder of Fascism, are remarkably similar to the ideas of modern-day Western Leftists. If Mussolini was not the direct teacher of modern-day Leftists, he was certainly a major predecessor. What Leftists advocate today is not, of course, totally identical with what Mussolini was advocating and doing 60 to 80 years ago in Italy but there are nonetheless extensive and surprising parallels. Early in the 20th century, he prophesied that the 20th century would be the century of Fascism and he got that right in that most of his ideas are still preached by the modern-day Left.



The popular view

Popular encyclopedias such as Funk & Wagnalls (1983) lump together Hitler's German regime, Mussolini's Italian regime, General Tojo's Japanese regime and Generalissimo Franco's Spanish regime under the single rubric of "fascist" so it seems clear that it is the accepted wisdom that all four regimes were basically similar and differed only in matters of detail. Anyone who knows even a little of the history of the period concerned, however, must realize how far from the truth this is. The feudal warlords of Japan, the antisemitic socialist of Germany, the Catholic monarchist of Spain and the pragmatic socialist of Italy were in fact really united over only one thing: Their dislike of Lenin and Stalin's Communism and "Bolshevism" generally. There clearly is some need, therefore, for us to look at what Mussolini and the Fascists really were and did.



The reality

In what follows, facts that should be easily checkable in popular encyclopaedias and textbooks will not be referenced. Less well-known facts, however, will be referenced. History is of course written by the victors and most summaries of historical Fascism are therefore written from a very anti-Fascist perspective so care is normally needed to tease out the facts behind the interpretations and value-judgments. That will attempted here.

Unlike many other accounts, considerable emphasis will be given here to Mussolini's early years. What politicians say in order to get into power and what they do once they gain power are notoriously two different things -- with Lenin and Stalin being not the least examples of that. A major aim therefore will be to see where Mussolini came from and what he did and said in order to get into power.

To do so, however, is a considerable trip back in time and one effect of that is that the political terminology of nearly 100 years ago was somewhat different from today. In reading quotations from the early days one must keep in mind that those Mussolini refers to as "Socialists" were in fact Marxists rather than social democrats and those whom Mussolini refers to as "liberals" were advocates of laissez faire and would hence be described as conservatives today. Mussolini started out as a Marxist but eventually devised Fascism as a "third way" (sound familiar?). He saw it as offering a middle way between Marxism and capitalism -- Leftist but not Marxist.



In Mussolini's own words

Let us listen initially to some reflections on the early days of Fascism by Mussolini himself -- first published in 1935 (See the third chapter in Greene, 1968).

"If the bourgeoisie think they will find lightning conductors in us they are the more deceived; we must start work at once .... We want to accustom the working class to real and effectual leadership".

And that was Mussolini quoting his own words from the early Fascist days. So while Mussolini had by that time (in his 30s) come to reject the Marxist idea of a class-war, he still saw himself as anti-bourgeois and as a saviour and leader of the workers. What modern-day Leftist could not identify with that?

"Therefore I desire that this assembly shall accept the revindication of national trades unionism"

So he was a good union man like most Leftists today.

"When the present regime breaks down, we must be ready at once to take its place"

Again a great Leftist hope and aspiration.

"Fascism has taken up an attitude of complete opposition to the doctrines of Liberalism, both in the political field and in the field of economics".

The "Liberalism" he refers to here would of course be called "Neo-liberalism" today -- the politics of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Mussolini opposed such politics and so do Leftists today.

"The present method of political representation cannot suffice".

Modern-day Leftists too seem to seek influence outside the normal democratic channels -- from strikes and demonstrations to often successful attempts to get the courts to make law.

"Fascism now and always believes in holiness and in heroism; that is to say in actions influenced by no economic motive"

He here also rejects the Communist emphasis on materialism. Leftism to this day is often seen as a religion and its agitators clearly often long to be seen as heroic and unmaterialistic.

"Fascism repudiates the conception of "economic" happiness"

Leftists today also tend to regard consumerism as gross (or say they do as they drive off in their Volvos).

"After the war, in 1919, Socialism was already dead as a doctrine: It existed only as a hatred".

Socialism has never been a buzzword in North American Leftist circles but it certainly was for a very long time in the rest of the world. And to modern day British Leftists too socialism has a meaning that is more nostalgic and emotional than concrete and many would be prepared to admit that it is functionally "dead". Mussolini, however was 70 years earlier in announcing the death. It should be noted, however, that Mussolini was principally referring here to the policies and doctrines of his own former Socialist Party -- which was explicitly Marxist -- and which were far more extreme than the socialism of (say) Clement Attlee and the postwar British Labour party.

"Fascism ..... was born of the need for action and it was itself from the beginning practical rather than theoretical".

Modern-day Leftist demonstrators too seem to be more interested in dramatic actions than in any coherent theory.

" one would there find no ordered expression of doctrine but a series of aphorisms, anticipations and aspirations".

This is how Mussolini described early Fascist meetings. Modern-day Leftist agitators too seem more interested in slogans than in any form of rational debate.

"If the 19th century has been the century of the individual (for liberalism means individualism), it may be conjectured that this is the century of the State.

This is Mussolini's famous prophecy about the 20th century in the Enciclopedia Italiana. It came true with the aid of the modern-day Left and their love of big government. To underline that, note that in 1900 the ratio of government spending to GDP in Italy was 10%, in the 1950s 30%, and it is now roughly 60% (Martino, 1998). In this prophecy, Mussolini rejected Marxian socialism because he disliked the Marxist notions of class war and historical inevitability but modern-day Leftists differentiate themselves from Marxists too.

But Mussolini was more like Lenin and Stalin in his overt rejection of democracy: "Fascism denies that the majority, by the simple fact that it is a majority, can direct human society". Most modern-day Leftists in the Western world would undoubtedly like to get rid of democracy too but they are less open about it than Mussolini was.

"Laissez faire is out of date"

To this day the basic free market doctrine of "laissez faire" is virtually a swear-word to most Leftists. Quoted from Smith (1967, p. 87).

"The paid slaves of kings in their gaudy uniforms, their chests covered with crosses, decorations and similar foreign and domestic hardware ..... blinding the public with dust and flaunting in its face their impudent display".

Here Hibbert (1962, p. 11) reports Mussolini's youthful contempt for the armed forces. Such anti-militarism would surely resound well with most student antiwar demonstrators of today.

"The Socialist party reaffirms its eternal faith in the future of the Workers' International, destined to bloom again, greater and stronger, from the blood and conflagration of peoples. It is in the name of the International and of Socialism that we invite you, proletarians of Italy, to uphold your unshakeable opposition to war".

This from Carsten (1967, p. 46). It is from an article that was published by Mussolini in the Socialist Party organ "Avanti!" of 22 September, 1914 during Mussolini's Marxist period. So Mussolini's anti-militarism persisted until he was aged 31. When compared with Mussolini's subsequent career this shows exactly where anti-militaristic and antiwar sentiments can ultimately lead.

"Our programme is simple. We want to rule Italy".

As I have argued at length elsewhere, that is the real program of any Leftist. But Mussolini had the honesty to be upfront about it. Quoted from Carsten (1967, p. 62).

Mussolini ha sempre ragione ("Mussolini is always right").

This is probably the most famous of the many slogans that were plastered up everywhere in Fascist Italy. It too has a resounding echo among Leftists today. I can think of examples where modern conservative politicians have apologized and retracted their views but I can think of no example where a Leftist has. In the old Soviet empire there was virtually no such thing as "negative" news reported in the media. Even plane crashes were ignored. And as Amis (2002) notes, even though the reality of the vast, destructive and brutal tyranny of the now collapsed Soviet regime is undeniable, Leftists to this day are almost universally unapologetic about their past support for it and may even still claim that Lenin was a great man.

And Mussolini's "Fascist Manifesto" of 1919 (full translation by Vox Day here) includes in Fascist policy such socialist gems as (I quote):

* The nationalization of all the arms and explosives factories.
* A strong progressive tax on capital that will truly expropriate a portion of all wealth.
* The seizure of all the possessions of the religious congregations and the abolition of all the bishoprics, which constitute an enormous liability on the Nation and on the privileges of the poor.
* The formation of a National Council of experts for labor, for industy, for transportation, for the public health, for communications, etc. Selections to be made from the collective professionals or of tradesmen with legislative powers, and elected directly to a General Commission with ministerial powers.
* A minimum wage.
* The participation of workers' representatives in the functions of industry commissions



Mussolini as described by historians

"For the proletariat must consider itself anti-patriotic by definition and necessity and made to realize that nationalism was a mask for rapacious militarism that should be left to the masters and that the national flag was, as Gustave Herve had said, a rag to be planted on a dunghill"

This is a summary of Mussolini's attitudes when he was aged 25 by Hibbert (1962, p. 14). So although in his 30s Mussolini become an ardent nationalist, in his youth he was as anti-nationalist as any America-hater among the American "liberal" youth of today.

"He was coming to the belief which was soon to dominate his life -- that the existing order must be overthrown by an elite of revolutionaries acting in the name of the people".

This summary of Mussolini's developing beliefs in his 20s by Hibbert (1962, p. 17) could hardly be a more quintessentially Leftist outlook.

"It contained several demands that were decidedly radical: A progressive tax on capital and a tax of eighty-five percent on war profits, universal franchise for men and women, a national militia, a minimum wage, nationalization of the munition industries, worker's participation in the management of industrial enterprises, the confiscation of all eccelesiastical property".

This is Carsten's (1967, p. 50) summary of Mussolini's June, 1919, political program, already mentioned. There would be very little in that which would not strike a chord with modern-day Leftists. Note that Mussolini was even a feminist by the standards of his day -- agitating for equal rights for women.

"He had a profound contempt for those whose overriding ambition was to be rich. It was a mania, he thought, a kind of disease, and he comforted himself with the reflection that the rich were rarely happy"

Here Hibbert (1962, p. 47) is describing a lifelong attitude of Mussolini that continued right into his time as Italy's Prime Minister -- when he refused to take his official salary. Given the contempt for the rich so often expressed by Leftists almost everywhere, Mussolini was clearly a Leftist paragon in that regard.

"There was much truth in the comment of a Rome newspaper that the new fasci did not aim at the defence of the ruling class or the existing State but wanted to lead the revolutionary forces into the Nationalist camp so as to prevent a victory of Bolshevism..

Here Carsten (1967, p. 50) also reports on not mistaking the rivalry between the Fascists and the Communists as being pro-establishment.

"Mussolini, however, declared that he was fighting the Socialists, not because or their socialism but because they were anti-national and reactionary".

This is again from Carsten (1967, p. 50). So Mussolini retained his socialist loyalties even though he had also become a nationalist.

"In the summer of 1919 crowds, indignant about recent price increases, invaded the shops, looted goods and insisted on price reductions. Mussolini and his fasci proclaimed their solidarity with the rioters. The "Popolo d'Italia" suggested that it would set a good example if some profiteers were strung up on lamp-posts and some hoarders smothered under the potatoes and the sides of bacon they were hiding".

So Mussolini was far from being an instinctive supporter of law and order (Carsten, 1967, p. 52). The "Popolo d'Italia" was Mussolini's own newspaper.

"There Mussolini was still following a distinctly radical line. he asserted that his programme was similar to that of the Socialists, that Fascism was helping their cause, that it would carry through the agrarian revolution, the only one that was possible in Italy. He even welcomed the occupation of the factories"

This is again from Carsten (1967, p. 56) -- summarizing Mussolini's speeches of 1920. Pledging revolution and welcoming worker occupation of the factories is still of course a wet dream of the more "revolutionary" Left today.

"On 16 November the new government presented itself to Parliament.... received an overwhelming vote of confidence ... Only Mussolini's old enemy Turati, the spokesman of the Socialists rejected the government ... but not even all the Socialist deputies voted against."

So when he finally came to power, Mussolini and the "Reds" of his own former party were still bitter rivals but he was still Leftist enough for some "Reds" to vote for him! (From Carsten, 1967, p. 65). Much later, Hitler too received some parliamentary support from Germany's Socialist party.

"Mussolini in March 1936 told the council of corporations that he did not wish to bureaucratize the entire economy of the nation but in practice the extension of government activities everywhere brought with it a top-heavy organization, slow and unresponsive, and quite out of touch with ordinary people".

This is from Smith (1967, p. 80) and describes a picture that is all too familiar to us today as the outcome of ever increasing cries for government regulation and intervention from Leftists. And Mussolini's disclaimer about bureaucratization is distinctly reminiscent of US President Bill Clinton's declaration that the era of big government is over. No doubt both Clinton and Mussolini crossed their fingers as they said it!

"Mussolini set the example in his revival of pagan rites, and in October 1928 instituted a ceremony in which patriotic citizens presented their national savings certificates as a burnt offering on an ancient altar of Minerva specially brought out of its museum for the purpose"

So do modern day Leftists find a superior spirituality in pagan pre-Christian religions such as the religions of the American Indians? Mussolini was there before them (Smith, 1967, p. 100).

And perhaps the ultimate comment by others on Mussolini is what Muravchik (2002) reminds us of at some length: Leftists of the prewar era worldwide very often praised and admired Mussolini as a great socialist innovator. It was once as fashionable among Leftists to praise his regime as it later became to praise Soviet Communism.

Horowitz (1998) also quotes historical summaries showing that many modern Leftist intellectual stratagems have precedents in prewar European Fascist thought generally.



Mussolini's Marxist Roots

So, how many people today are aware that Mussolini, that great Fascist ogre, was in his youth an incandescent revolutionary socialist, a labor-union agitator who was jailed for his pains (Hibbert, 1962)? He was as radical as any student radical of today. Even in his childhood, he was expelled from two schools for his rebellious behaviour.

After that he became one of Italy's most prominent Marxist theoreticians and an intimate of Lenin. He was in fact first dubbed "Il Duce" (the Leader) when he was a member of Italy's (Marxist) Socialist Party and between 1912 and 1914 he was the editor of their newspaper, "L'Avanti". After his split with the Socialist Party he started his own Leftist newspaper "Il Popolo d'Italia" ("The people of Italy").

When he broke with the Socialist party in 1914, it was not over any dissatisfaction with socialist ideology but rather because the Socialists were neutralists in the First World War whereas Mussolini correctly foresaw that the Austro/German forces would not win the war and therefore wanted Italy to join the Allied side and thus get a slice of Austrian territory at the end of the war. Italians had suffered many humiliations at the hands of the Austrians and there must have been very few Italians who did not share Mussolini's desire to seize historically Italian territory from them. Like many Leftists then and since Mussolini did not have any principles that he allowed to stand in the way of a grab for power.

It should be noted that Mussolini's views in this matter did not at all disqualify him from continuing as a Marxist. Like many other Marxists of his time (See Gregor, 1979), Mussolini tempered his view of the importance of class-solidarity with the recognition that both Marx and Engels had in their lifetimes lent their support to a number of wars between nations. He looked, in other words, not only at broad Marxist theory but also at how Marx and Engels applied their theories. Such "pragmatism" was, of course, a hallmark of Mussolini's thinking. And, like the Communists, Mussolini had no aversion to war.

As further commentary on Mussolini's Marxist credentials, it may be worth noting that, long before the Bolshevik revolution, Mussolini had supported the orthodox Marxist (cf. the Mensheviks) view that backward States like Italy and Russia had to go through a capitalist or bourgeois democratic stage before evolving into socialism. It was this, as much as anything, that led Mussolini to collaborate with the Italian establishment when he eventually gained power.

Mussolini's disagreement with Lenin in this matter therefore meant that Mussolini and his Fascist friends greeted with considerable glee the terrible economic disaster (with national income at one third of the 1913 level) that emerged in Russia after the Bolshevik takeover. They saw both the Bolshevik disaster and their own eventual successes as proving the correctness of Marx's theory of historical evolution. When, in 1919, Lenin began to speak (in language that could have been Mussolini's) of the need to hold his country together with "a single iron will" (Gregor, 1979, p. 124) it put him belatedly but rather clearly in Mussolini's camp.

It should also be noted that Mussolini was the son of an impoverished and very Leftist father who worked mainly as a blacksmith. Mussolini was very proud of these working-class roots and it was a great recreation of his, even after coming to power, to take drives in the country with his wife and stop at various farmhouses on the way for a chat with the family there. He would enjoy discussing the crops, the weather and all the usual rural topics and obviously just liked the feeling of being one of the people. His claim to represent the people was not just theory but heartfelt. And he never gave up his "anti-bourgeois" rhetoric.



Mussolini gaining power

After 1918, Italy was in chaos, with Communist upheavals everywhere. Mussolini initially expressed his sympathies for these upheavals but soon saw that they were reducing Italy to a form of anarchy that was helping no-one. He therefore formed his "Fasci di combattimento" -- mainly comprised in the beginning of fellow ex-servicemen -- to help restore order. This they did by force, breaking up the Socialist and Communist rallies, strikes and organizations. Internecine feuds between Leftists have always been common, however.

Nonetheless, Fascism was subversive in that it fought against the traditional Italian ruling elite -- who were essentially still 19th century liberals (what would nowadays be called "neo-liberals" or just "conservatives"). It was also subversive because of its desire to innovate in many ways and to replace the existing ruling class with a new Fascist ruling class.

So, while in Italy, as elsewhere in interwar Europe, individual Communists, Fascists, anarchists and others fought fierce street battles with one-another in a way that is reminiscent of nothing so much as the turf wars between rival black gangs in Los Angeles today, many of the Leftist brawlers eventually went over to the Fascists --- showing how slight the real differences were between them.

When he did gain power, he implemented economic policies that would endear him to many of the Left today. His policies were basically protectionist. He controlled the exchange-rate of the Italian currency and promoted that old favourite of the economically illiterate -- autarky -- meaning that he tried to get Italy to become wholly self-sufficient rather than rely on foreign trade. He wanted to protect Italian products from competing foreign products. The Leftist anti-globalizers of today would approve.

And he even had some success. By 1939 he had doubled Italy's grain production from its traditional level, enabling Italy to cut wheat imports by 75% (Smith, 1967, p. 92). As with all autarkist nonsense however, the price was high. The extra grain could be produced only at high cost so Italians now had to pay twice as much for their grain. But what anti-globalizer would worry about that?

But socialism was of course not the only string to Mussolini's bow. He was also a strident Italian nationalist with an avowed aim to restore the Roman empire. He certainly offered Italians a new pride in themselves that was clearly welcomed by many Italians.



Nationalism as an exciting novelty

Something that seems generally to be overlooked is that the three countries with the most notable Fascist movements in the early 20th century (Germany, Italy and Spain) were all in countries with fragile national unity. Germany and Italy had become unified countries only in the late 19th century and Spain, of course, is only nominally unified to this day -- with semi-autonomous governments in Catalonia and the Basque country. Right up until the end of the Prussian hegemony in 1918, Germans saw themselves primarily as Saxons, Bavarians, Prussians etc rather than as Germans and the contempt for Southern Italians among Northern Italians is of course legendary.

So the fierce nationalism of the Fascists (though Franco held himself above the Spanish Falange to some extent) appears to have been at least in part the zeal of the convert. Nationalism was something new and exciting and was a gratification to be explored vigorously. And the Fascists/Nazis undoubtedly exploited it to the hilt. The romance of the new nation was an important asset for them.

So if we regard the creation of large nation states as a good thing (a fairly dubious proposition) the small silver lining that we can see in the dark cloud of Fascism is that they do seem to have had some success in creating a sense of nationhood. A German identity, in particular, would seem to be the creation of Hitler. There was certainly not much of the sort before him.

There are of course differences between the three countries but in all three an acceptance of their nation-state now seems to be well-entrenched. This acceptance seems to be strongest in Germany -- probably in part because modern Germany is a Federal Republic with substantial power devolved to the old regions (Laender) so that local loyalties are also acknowledged. Spain has moved only partly in the direction of federalism and there is of course a strong political movement in Northern Italy for reform in that direction also.

It is perhaps worth noting that it took a ferocious war (the civil war) to create an American sense of nationhood too.



Was Fascism middle-class?

The commonest Marxist analysis of Fascism seems to be that it was "bourgeois" -- the last gasp of a failing middle class in its desperate struggle to hold onto its position against the rising tide of the working class. Since the leading Marxists themselves -- from Marx and Engels, through Lenin to Pol Pot have themselves always been middle class, this analysis has its amusing side. The perennial Leftist tactic of accusing others of what is in fact true of themselves would alone account for that characterization of Fascism. But is the characterization nonetheless true? There is much to say that it is not. The breadth of Mussolini's appeal is in fact one of the most remarkable things about him. The Fascists certainly included many middle class people but they included workers and aristocrats as well. Even Jews were prominent among them! But rather than attampt to plough through the arguments in detail here, let me just quote a summary of what Michael Mann, a respected Left-leaning historian of Fascism, says on the subject:

In Fascists, Mr. Mann contends that the rise of right-wing authoritarian movements between the world wars can best be understood as, in effect, nation-statism forging not a cage but a concentration camp. His analysis puts him at odds with the Marxist interpretation of fascism, which treats it as a violent effort to preserve capitalism from the challenge of left-wing mobilizations following World War I. Mr. Mann also rejects efforts to treat fascism as a totalitarian "political religion" emerging in reaction against modernization and democracy.

All of Europe underwent severe economic crisis in the period between the wars, he notes. But fascists made no serious bid for power in countries where the state had both well-established institutions of representative democracy and a solid basis of infrastructural power. In England, for example, the black-shirted members of Oswald Mosley's British Union of Fascists were exotic and attention-grabbing, but ineffectual at much besides outbursts of street hooliganism.....

Mr. Mann also says that "the degree of capitalist support for fascist movements . varied considerably between the different countries." What was consistent, however, was that the core fascist constituencies had strong vested interests in the growth and dynamism of the nation-state. "Soldiers and veterans above all, but also civil servants, teachers, and public-sector manual workers were all disproportionately fascist in almost all the countries of mass fascism," he writes. Students, too, were always heavily represented.

Mr. Mann contends that, important as economic factors were, they are insufficient to understanding the movement. Consider the contrast between Hungary and Romania. "Hungary had probably the worst middle-class job prospects, Romania the best," writes Mr. Mann, "yet both produced fascism among those most affected, students and public-sector workers." He also notes that in both countries fascists "recruited more from proletarian than bourgeois backgrounds."

More here


De Felice, (1977, p. 176) too says that Mussolini found supporters and adversaries in all social classes. And particularly in the early years of Fascism, Mussolini often attacked the bourgeoisie in his speeches!

Whether Nazism was middle-class is treated here



Mussolini the environmentalist

As well as being an "anti-globalizer", there were several other ways in which Mussolini would have appealed to modern-day greenies. He made Capri a bird sanctuary (Smith, 1967, p. 84) and in 1926 he issued a decree reducing the size of newspapers to save wood pulp. And, believe it or not, he even mandated gasohol -- i.e. mixing industrial alcohol with petroleum products to make fuel for cars (Smith, 1967, p. 87). Mussolini also disliked the population drift from rural areas into the big cities and in 1930 passed a law to put a stop to it unless official permission was granted (Smith, 1967, p. 90). What Green/Left advocate could ask for more?



Mussolini the pragmatist

Although Mussolini never ceased preaching socialism in some form, his actions when in power were like those of most politicians: Many unrealistic promises were broken and policies were adopted that in fact hurt the workers (such as wage cuts). The important point, however, is that the policies he in fact adopted once in power were not adopted for mere ideological reasons but because they were the policies that he thought would work best for Italy and, thus, ultimately for all Italians. As "Conservative" political parties tend to think in this way also (Gilmour, 1978), it is presumably in part this that causes Mussolini to be referred to as a Rightist. His appeal to Italians, however was as a socialist and a nationalist.

For all his pragmatism, however, it should also be recognized (contrary to what many of his critics say) that Mussolini did have a well-publicized and coherent economic strategy mapped out before he came to power and that policies that are sometimes seen as merely "pragmatic" were also theoretically grounded in his old Marxist ideas. He was well aware of both Italy's poverty and the inefficiency of its bureaucrats and blamed much of the former on the latter. Following the Marxist theory of developmental stages, he argued that the only alternative to the bureaucrats that would mobilize Italy's limited resources was the fostering of private enterprise and capitalism. He even advocated privatization of telecommunications and the post office! This coincides, of course, with the way modern-day Leftists (particularly in Britain) have abandoned the idea of State-run enterprises and acknowledged the benefits of privatization.

Mussolini was, however, far from being any sort of free-marketeer. Just like most modern-day Leftist politicians, he advocated private enterprise within a strict set of State controls designed, among other things, to prevent abuse of monopoly power (Gregor, 1979, Ch. 5).

So we see that Mussolini again had remarkable prescience. Deng Xiaoping of China and Gorbachev of Russia seem now to be generally seen as the first Marxists to have discovered pragmatism and private enterprise. Mussolini, however, did it all 60 or more years before them.



Mussolini's socialist deeds

One major "socialist" reform of the economy that is still a misty ideal to modern-day Leftists Mussolini actually carried out. He attempted to centralize control of industry by declaring a "Corporate State" which divided all Italian industry up into 22 "corporations". In these corporations both workers and managers were supposed to co-operate to run industry together -- but under Fascist guidance, of course. The Corporate State was supposed to ensure social justice and give the workers substantial control of industry.

And in 1933 Mussolini even promised that the National Council of Corporations would eventually replace the Parliament! Surely the ultimate unionist's dream! And the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations created in 1939 largely fulfilled that promise. Since Mussolini had dictatorial powers by then it was largely tokenism but it nonetheless showed how Leftist his propaganda was.

In reality the Fascist appointees to the corporations tended to take the side of the management and what resulted was really capitalism within a tight set of government controls. Since most of Europe and much of the rest of the world moved in that direction in the post-war era, Mussolini was in this also ahead of his times. And if the waning of the "Red" influence on Western economies in the post-Soviet era has led to some deregulation of business, the rise of the "Greens" has added a vast new area of government regulation. The precedent set by Mussolini is still being followed!

Some other clearly Leftist initiatives that Mussolini took were a big expansion of public works and a great improvement in social insurance measures. He also set up the "Dopolavoro" (after work) organization to give workers cheap recreations of various kinds (cf. the Nazi Kraft durch Freude movement). His public health measures (such as the attack on tuberculosis and the setting up of a huge maternal and child welfare organization) were particularly notable for their rationality and efficiency and, as such, were rewarded with great success. For instance, the incidence of tuberculosis dropped dramatically and infant mortality declined by more than 20% (Gregor, p. 259). Together with big improvements in education and public infrastructure, such measures gave Fascist Italy what was arguably the most advanced welfare State in the world at the time.

And if influential American "liberal" economists such as Galbraith (1969) can bemoan the low level of spending on public works as "private affluence and public squalor", Mussolini was well ahead on that. As Hibbert (1962, p. 56) says, Mussolini

"instituted a programme of public works hitherto unrivalled in modern Europe. Bridges, canals and roads were built, hospitals and schools, railway stations and orphanages, swamps were drained and land reclaimed, forest were planted and universities were endowed."

Given the modern-day Leftist's love of government provision of services, it would seem that Mussolini should be their hero in that respect. He actually did what they advocate and did it around 70 years ago.

Posted at 09:55 am by Psychomike
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Monday, November 22, 2004
UK Stops 9/11 Style Attacks!

Britain's '9/11' foiled by security forces
Key points
Security forces thwart al-Qaeda plan to attack Canary Wharf and Heathrow Security chiefs claim they have foiled four or five terrorist attacks Upcoming Queen's speech expected to be dominated by security

Key quote"The significance of this would depend on whether these suicide training exercises were disrupted within the United Kingdom, and what they actually consisted of in terms of preparation, such as the indoctrination of key individuals" - Dr Magnus Ranstorp, director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St Andrews University

Story in full AN AL-QAEDA terror plot involving aircraft being flown simultaneously into the towers of Canary Wharf and Heathrow Airport has been foiled by British security forces, it emerged last night.

The 9/11-style attacks on the two high-profile London targets are among four or five al-Qaeda strikes that security chiefs believe they have stopped, it was reported.

According to a senior authoritative source last night, training programmes for suicide pilots have been disrupted and the devastating attacks foiled. The Home Office and Metropolitan Police declined to comment on the reports.

Security has been heightened around strategic centres across the capital in the wake of the 2001 attacks, which have plunged the world into a series of conflicts aimed at defeating terrorism.

Last night, Dr Magnus Ranstorp, the director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St Andrews University, said Canary Wharf would be an obvious target as it was the financial centre of London's Docklands district, and Heathrow was the capital's main airport. He said: "If this is the case, then of course there may have been different degrees of development and preparation for such attacks - it may not have been fully operational plans that were either days or hours away.

"There has already been a security clampdown around Heathrow, and that decision in itself was not taken lightly given the political and economic consequences of such an action.

"If this is the case it would justify what the security services and principal counter-terrorism officials have been saying for some time, that there is a danger and they have been working over-time to try and prevent this threat.

"Canary Wharf, and the City itself, is an obvious target as it is in the financial district of London and therefore remains a major economic target for terrorists.

"It is a great credit to the law enforcement and security services who are carrying out one of the more advanced counter-terrorism operations in Europe."

Regarding the alleged disruption of suicide pilot training courses, Dr Ranstorp said: "The significance of this would depend on whether these suicide training exercises were disrupted within the United Kingdom, and what they actually consisted of in terms of preparation, such as the indoctrination of key individuals.

"There are different degrees of preparation - from initial planning to training to deployment - so the significance of this would depend on at what stage the operations were disrupted."

More than 2,700 people died in the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon more than three years ago.

News of the plots against British targets came ahead of a Queen's Speech, which is expected to be dominated by the issue of security. Numerous bills tackling terrorism, organised crime and anti-social behaviour have been trailed.

Home Secretary David Blunkett's more controversial proposals, such as the use in court of evidence acquired by wire taps, will be shelved until after the General Election expected in May.

However, the government's programme will set the scene for a poll campaign Tony Blair is said to want to fight on security. Opponents have accused the Home Secretary of deliberately creating a climate of fear.

Mr Blunkett has recently insisted that Labour will campaign on hope not fear, but then warned that forthcoming trials will show al-Qaeda are "on our doorstep and threatening lives". His comments came after Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir John Stevens spoke of his frustration at not being able to talk about anti-terror successes.

MI5 chief Eliza Manningham-Buller also spoke publicly about Britain's success in thwarting fanatics. Mr Blair faced accusations of alarmism 18 months ago when troops in armoured vehicles surrounded Heathrow Airport.

However, the government insisted that the dramatic action came in response to specific intelligence.

It was not clear whether it was this event that thwarted one of up to five strikes reportedly prevented since the 2001 US attacks, and which ITV News was reporting last night.

• MI5 security advice• Help MI5 in the fight against terror

By: CHRIS MCAULEY AND RUSSELL JACKSON -- 23-Nov-04

Posted at 11:10 pm by Psychomike
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Sunday, November 21, 2004
Photo's Of The First Korean War

 

KOREAN WAR PHOTO-DOCUMENTARY

Preface

Click Thumbnail For Wider-Angle Annotated Photo
(These annotated views will open in new windows, so as not to require re-loading of this page)
B.L. Kortegaard

Fighting Vehicles


Navy KW Photos


Aussie KW Photos


Pusan


Inchon


KW TimeLine


China


Stalemate


PUSAN PERIMETER BATTLE

South to the Naktong, North to theYalu - Roy E. Appleman
Army Overview Version of this phase


Map of Korea

Korean Terrain
Invasion Map

NK Invades - 6/25/50
East Central Asia Map

Pusan, 7/50, UN Entry port

Exhausted ROKs - 7/1/50

Lambs To The Slaughter

ROK wounded - 7/28/50

34th Infantry, 7/6/50

19th Infantry at Taepyong-ni

Bombed Out T34s

5th Marines Mount Out

ROKs Moving Up

155 Howitzers in Battery

Death From The Skies

Bowling Alley - 8/21/50

Marines at the Naktong

WIA, 8/50

Rescue under fire

Navy Corpsmen at work

Bombed Out T34's

Hill 99, 9/2/50

M-46 Patton - 90mm HV

T34 Burns from M-26 Hit

31 Days On The Line

M-24 Chaffees at Masan

Another Murdered GI

One of the Murderers?

More Murdered Civilians

Captured NK Weapons

Sanctuary for murderers?

76mm Self Propelled Guns

INVASION OF INCHON

Other Korean War Photos of 1950
Army Overview Version of this phase


The Fighting Wantuck

Inchon - Assault on Wolmi-do

Marines mop up Wolmi

Wolmi-do Gunpit

Securing the causeway

Red Beach under fire

To A Posthumous MOH

Red Beach Captured

1st Marines Hit Blue Beach

MacArthur and a few Marines

T34s on the Road to Seoul

1st Marines take Yongdungpo

On the road to Seoul

Return to the Han, 9/50

Rescue Under Heavy Fire

Seoul, Captured NK Barricade

Rescue under sniper fire

Clearing a tunnel

Anti-Sniper Action

The Men

The Cost

CHINA STRIKES

Task Force Faith

Ebb and Flow - Billy C. Mossman
Army Overview Version of this phase



ROKs cross the 38th

Wonsan Harbor, 9/50

China crosses the Yalu

British Troops in pursuit

Danish Hospital Ship

Airborne Trapped

Kumchon Pocket

Pyongyang, October 19

First into Hyesanjin

The Chongchon River

The Terrible Cost Continues

Wonsan, 10/26/50

Marine Pilot's Luck Ran Out

1st Phase Offensive

CCF124 faces 7th Marines

In The West

China Strikes

Unsan, 11/1

Army Prisoners

China Hits ROK 1stID

Marine Prisoners

CCF 38th Army Waits

CCF 42nd Army Infiltrates

CCF 39th Corps Waits

1stMarDiv Moves Into Chosin

Generals tour the Yalu

Home By Christmas

China Attacks, 11/25

American Armor Flees

Pursuit in the West

Yudam-ni, BattnAid

Hagaru-ri, East Hill

Marines Pull Back

Yudam-ni Rear Guard

Destroyed

Corsair Napalm Strike

CCF Recapture Pyongyang

North Korean Refugees

Negro Prisoners

3rd Div. Artillery Support

Stalled, 12/6/50

Koto-ri Breakout

Destroying Roadblock 12/50

Another Roadblock

Hungnam, Safety

Last Troops Evacuated

Warehouse Areas Destroyed

GoodBye

COUNTER-ATTACKS, STALEMATE, THE OUTPOST WAR

Truce Tent and Fighting Front - Walter G. Hermes
Army Overview Version of this phase



1/1/51 - The Fatal Step

China Captures SK Capitol

China crosses the Han

Thunderbolt

5th RCT Moves Toward Han

Hoengsong, 11-13 Feb

Chipyong-ni

Captured M46 Patton

Operation Killer

Operation Ripper

Seoul Retaken

Drive to the 38th

187th RCT at Munsan-ni

CCF 5th Campaign

Drive to trap 24th Infantry

After Retreat From Imjin

Inferno From The Air

CCF Cross the Chau

Air Power

A kind of victory

Fire Power

Truman opted to stop further pursuit and destruction of the CCF and NK armies in favor of truce negotiations which began July 10, 1951, resulting in a stalemate until they ended July 27, 1953.

In retrospect, with the huge Chinese Manchurian reserves and the nuclear power of the USSR still menacing and untapped, this was probably a wise decision. But ....

Half the total military casualties of the Korean War occurred while those talks dragged on.


Digger

Photo-Documentary of an Aussie Infantryman

Royal Australian Regiment, 1951-1953

The Australians were among the best fighting men in the UN forces. The above historical site is a rare portrayal of life and endurance along the MLR during those savage, wasted years.

Iron Triangle, July 3, 1951

The Punchbowl

Bloody Ridge, 9/51

Island Hopping

A Visit To The Hinge

Commonwealth POWs

CCF rebuilds

Underground Wall Of China

Glass against iron

Transfer at Sea

Wounded during patrol

A UN effort

Fate of a Patrol

Reviewing Assault Plan

Patrol Gearing Up

Punchbowl, February 1953

MiG Killers

Tank artillery

CCF MultiTube Rockets

Safe in Manchuria

Famous CCF Sniper

77 Squadron Meteors

"Die like a gentleman"

Crash Landing

Devastating arty support

White Horse Hill

Sniper Ridge

Marking bunkers

Babs, RAANC

Grave for UN prisoners

Vertical Envelopment

25 Infantry Division Bunkers

Bloody Nevada Cities

1951-1953
Summary of Armistice Negotiations

Army Overview Version of this phase
Observations by an Australian Platoon Leader


The dance begins
Kaesong, July 8, 1951

UN POW "Olympics"
Propaganda in the North

Koje-do POW Riots
Chaos in the South


Cease Fire, At Last


July 27, 1953


Golden Bond


KW Fiction Example 1

Tech Rep


Nerds at War

Souvenirs


KW Fiction Example 2

Posted at 09:25 am by Psychomike
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Saturday, November 20, 2004
The Curse Of Theresa Kerry

The Making of a Non-President
Behind the Scenes With The Kerry Campaign

By Howard Kurtz
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, November 15, 2004; Page C01

Teresa Heinz Kerry hardly suffered from a lack of media attention during the presidential campaign.

But if a lengthy, behind-the-scenes Newsweek piece is on the mark, press accounts failed to reflect the degree to which she was a disruptive force in her husband's campaign who often looked "sullen," was deemed a "hypochondriac" by the staff and had a knack for "silencing a cheering crowd."

"On the campaign bus," Newsweek reports, "there had been constant talk of marital spats between the candidate and his wife. . . . Though they kept Teresa's sometimes erratic behavior out of their copy, when they were speaking among themselves . . . the reporters were increasingly vocal in mocking the candidate's wife."

It is difficult for daily journalists covering a candidate to report on the personal travails and staff infighting that envelop most campaigns. Some reporters who traveled with John Kerry said these stories are hard to pin down because campaign officials refused to discuss such details on the record. Others said it was risky to write stories that would alienate not just the candidate but the staffers on whom reporters depend for news.

"There were hints in the daily coverage that Kerry had problems with being decisive and Teresa was not completely helpful," says Evan Thomas, who wrote the Newsweek article. "But I don't think anybody tried to step back and look at the pattern of it. The press has gotten so consumed with the day-to-day that they've forgotten about or become uninterested in the whole Teddy White approach to reconstruction."

But Chicago Tribune correspondent Jill Zuckman says: "A lot of these things just don't happen in plain view of reporters. And few people within the campaign were willing or able to discuss the state of the candidate's marriage. The only thing that was apparent was that Senator Kerry's wife tended to put crowds to sleep while speaking, and I think that was captured in the profiles written about her."

Newsweek (which is owned by The Washington Post Co.) got special access for seven reporters segregated from its regular coverage by promising not to publish the article -- part of a forthcoming book -- until after Election Day. President Bush's campaign granted less access and periodically booted Newsweek staffers from its Arlington headquarters, once for reporting on an off-the-record campaign party.

Among the magazine's findings:

• Kerry was both "cranky" and more indecisive than he was portrayed by the media. "I couldn't get the man to make decisions," said former campaign manager Jim Jordan. As late as days before the Democratic convention, Kerry was still "dithering" and presiding over endless discussions on whether to abandon public financing for the fall campaign before deciding against private fundraising. Top aides grew so tired of Kerry continuing to seek advice on issues they considered settled that they took away his cell phone.

• Kerry "never did learn how to deliver a speech" and was privately counseled by Washington speech coach Michael Sheehan on shifting to "a more conversational style." Ted Kennedy told Kerry he used "too much Senatese," and the candidate's daughter, Alexandra, tried to get Steven Spielberg to intervene. Kerry would cross out his speechwriters' most pithy lines as too "slogany."

• Teresa Kerry was a major "distraction" who "demanded everyone's attention, including her husband's." During the primaries she told Jordan: "I want you to issue a challenge for me to debate Howard Dean." On a Grand Canyon hike meant to provide footage of a happy family vacation, "Teresa was soon complaining of migraines" as the candidate kept pulling along "his sullen wife and children." Later, Kerry confidant John Sasso told her that she was being too critical of her husband and depressing his spirits. Reporters said last week that the billionaire heiress was banished to travel on her own before they could write about her impact.

• By the fall, Kerry was "unhappy" with senior advisers Robert Shrum and Tad Devine and "annoyed" with communications director Stephanie Cutter, described as too slow-moving and the target of frequent complaints by the traveling press corps. Several Kerry aides call the depiction of Cutter unfair, with senior adviser Joe Lockhart saying: "She had a Herculean task and overall did a very good job."

In early September, CNN commentator James Carville said in a meeting with campaign manager Mary Beth Cahill and the newly hired Lockhart that if Cahill didn't give Lockhart effective control of the operation, the ragin' Cajun would go on "Meet the Press" the next day "and tell the truth about how bad it is." And when Lockhart, the former Clinton White House spokesman, began controlling the campaign's message, longtime Kerry loyalists complained that he and other Clinton veterans were "burnishing their reputations" by taking credit in the press for the campaign's positive moves. Such criticism about leaks nearly prompted Lockhart to quit within days.

Both campaigns are disputing some details. Kerry aides say Cutter never grabbed a shotgun and dramatically aimed it at the sky during a Kerry skeet-shooting event in Iowa. Steve Schmidt, the Bush camp's rapid-response chief, has told Newsweek he never dubbed himself Patton, as the magazine reported, or marched through the halls yelling "Kill! Kill! Kill!"

Kerry press secretary David Wade says he doesn't recognize the portrait of his boss: "Having been written off twice, during the primaries and after the Republican convention, we battled back and came within 60,000 votes of winning the presidency." Had Kerry prevailed, Wade says, the piece would have chronicled "how we did everything brilliantly."

Or would it? Thomas recalls chatting with Newsweek Editor Mark Whitaker as exit polls pointed to a Kerry victory. "We just laughed and said, 'Oh my God, we have this piece that says the Kerry campaign was pretty badly run. What if he wins?' We just sort of shrugged."

Posted at 12:36 pm by Psychomike
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Wednesday, November 17, 2004
How Hoover Used Joe McCarthy, Liberalism's Crisis

THE SNAKE THAT SWALLOWED ITS TAIL: LIBERALISM TODAY; HOW HOOVER USED JOE McCARTHY TO HIDE FBI FAILURE
 
 
 
Bookshop

The Snake That Swallowed Its Tail: some contradictions in modern liberalism
Mark Garnett Imprint Academic, 96pp, £8.95
ISBN 0907845886
Reviewed by John Gray
One of the curious features of the present time is that, even though we are all liberal, there is no agreement about what liberalism means. Some people will tell you that the core liberal value is personal liberty, but others insist it is equality. Some say that liberal values require multiculturalism, while others believe they demand a common culture based on personal autonomy. For some, liberalism is a strictly political theory that applies only to the structure of the state. For others, it is a whole way of life.

These are not just minor differences. They extend to the basic concepts of liberalism itself and to the underlying philosophical beliefs in line with which they are interpreted. If some liberals see freedom as mere absence of interference, others view it as a positive ability to act. For some liberal thinkers, justice requires protecting private property; for others, it means redistribution. Underlying these differences are even larger divergences: some liberals are ardent supporters of rights, while others are defenders of utilitarianism; some are devotees of social contract theory, and yet others are partisans of value pluralism.

What all liberals have in common is a touching certainty that they are right. Liberalism is a missionary faith, and proselytising zeal is not normally conducive to sceptical inquiry. Whatever the core values of liberalism, they can surely conflict with one another - and with other goods such as social cohesion. Yet it rarely occurs to liberals to ask themselves whether their values - however vaguely or inconsistently defined - are viable in the long term.

It is this last question that preoccupies Mark Garnett. In The Snake That Swallowed Its Tail, he argues that a highly individualistic type of liberalism - "the philosophy of the short term, of the speed-dating, cold-calling society" - has come to pervade political life in Britain. In the past, thinkers such as John Stuart Mill had a vision of liberal values in which altruism was prized. As Garnett sees it, Mill's "fleshed-out" liberalism was displaced in the Thatcher era by a "hollowed-out", Hobbesian philosophy in which self-interest is at the centre. Liberalism of this latter kind is ultimately self-undermining, he believes: it can end only by "swallowing its tail", at which point a reaction in favour of saner values will set in.

Few academic writers know enough about the business of politics to be able to write intelligently about the tangled links between theory and practice. Garnett is one of the few, and his arresting and often amusing account of the political history of postwar Britain as a transition from fleshed-out to hollowed-out liberalism will be read with profit by anyone interested in the role of ideas in politics.

This does not mean that his account is always convincing. Like many critics of the narrow version of liberal individualism that has shaped politics since the 1980s, Garnett portrays it as a deeply pessimistic philosophy that owes a great deal to Hobbes. To my mind, it is precisely the opposite. In so far as Margaret Thatcher and her disciples had anything resembling a coherent political vision, it was of a neoliberal utopia.

Thatcher believed that the British economy could be revolutionised, and that at the same time Britain's culture could remain unchanged - or revert to the norms of the 1950s. She never understood that the ideology of choice and innovation she promoted in the economy would inevitably spill over into other areas of life. She believed that unfettered choice would somehow be virtuous, and completely failed to foresee the anomic, crime-ridden society that has actually developed. Like other neoliberals, she seems to have imagined that freedom is the natural human condition - a view Thomas Hobbes scorned heartily, and rightly so.

If The Snake That Swallowed Its Tail has a positive message, it is "Back to Mill" - the embodiment of the fleshed-out liberal philosophy that has supposedly been abandoned over the past generation. No doubt Garnett is right in thinking that Mill's was a superior form of liberalism, but it is hard to see how it can be revived today. He tells us that it will return only "once Britain has been entirely hollowed out". However, to adapt a well-known adage of Adam Smith's, there is much hollowness in a nation - and in liberalism. Most likely Britain will drift on much as it does at present, a country where everyone believes in liberal values, yet no one knows what they are.

John Gray's latest book is Heresies: against progress and other illusions (Granta)
 
 

Intelligence in Recent Public Literature

Chasing Spies:  How the FBI Failed in Counterintelligence But Promoted the Politics of McCarthyism in the Cold War Years

By Athan Theoharis.  Chicago:  Ivan R. Dee, 2002.  307 pages.

Reviewed by David Robarge


Since the 11 September 2001 attacks by al-Qaida, the FBI has taken on a counterterrorism function that more closely resembles espionage and counterintelligence than traditional law enforcement.  The Bureau
has had trouble managing this transition from “cop” to “spook,” and it undoubtedly will encounter more problems now that its counterterrorism responsibilities have grown under the new homeland security legislation.  Counterintelligence and counterterrorism share many operational characteristics, as well as a sense of urgency and a high frustration factor that can lead to procedural corner cutting.  While we construct a new domestic security apparatus to help fight international terrorism, we should pause to examine Athan Theoharis’s Chasing Spies, a useful, although at times tendentious, cautionary tale about how the FBI conducted counterintelligence against the Soviets from the 1930s through the 1950s.

Theoharis—a historian at Marquette University and a prolific scholar and critic of the FBI—wants us to be aware of what he sees as the FBI’s checkered record on hunting Soviet spies during those years, when, he argues, counterintelligence quickly mutated into (often unlawful) surveillance of dissidents, nonconformists, “unfriendly” politicians, and sundry “radicals.”  As Bureau investigators threw their nets farther and wider to snare Kremlin agents, they became seized with finding “the enemy within” because their superiors, especially J. Edgar Hoover, pursued an ideological agenda that subordinated law enforcement to anticommunism.  That history, Theoharis suggests, provides a lesson for us in the current climate of anxiety and suspicion:  Counterterrorism directed at mysterious foreigners with alien creeds could easily lapse into the same excesses that anti-Soviet counterintelligence did not so long ago.

Although Hoover is gone, Theoharis argues that his legacy of politicized counterintelligence may endure.  With the cases of Wen Ho Lee, Robert Hanssen, Timothy McVeigh, and the Ruby Ridge militia in mind, the author has observed, in interviews about homeland security, that:  “If you are going to give agents broad authority, how do you keep them from roaming far afield?  The history is not pretty.” [1]

In Chasing Spies, Theoharis uses mostly FBI releases secured under the Freedom of Information Act and declassified decryptions of KGB messages to move the discussion of Soviet espionage in America into territory familiar to him:  what the Bureau did about Kremlin spying, and why.  According to his research, the FBI’s investigations of Soviet espionage in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s were far more extensive and intrusive than we have previously known, yet few spies were caught and even fewer tried.  Possible reasons are:  (1) The Bureau was incompetent; (2) Democratic administrations, out of indifference or partisanship, inhibited the FBI from investigating Soviet espionage; (3) Soviet operational security was very good; (4) there were not that many Soviet spies to catch; (5) the Bureau’s information was collected illegally and could not be used in court; and/or (6) the FBI was using its counterintelligence capabilities for purposes other than finding Kremlin agents and their supporters.  Theoharis’s assessment:  mostly (5) and (6), with a bit of (3) and (4) thrown in, as he concedes that “Moscow rules” were tough to work against and he tends to play down the scope and effect of Soviet espionage in America.

Between 1936 and 1952, the Bureau’s budget ballooned from $5,000,000 to $90,000,000, and the staff went from 1,580 employees to 14,657.  According to Theoharis, FBI managers used some of the new money and personnel to conduct not only standard investigations but also an unprecedented array of then-illegal operations—break-ins, wiretaps, bugging, and mail opening—against American communists and communist sympathizers. [2]   But all that detective work was mostly for naught, the author concludes.  “From a law enforcement or legitimate counterintelligence standpoint, the information accumulated . . . had little value . . . because [it] either was illegally obtained . . . thus negating prosecution . . . or did not document the violation of a federal statute.” [3]   Or at least not a federal espionage statute—under the Smith Act’s sedition provisions, Communist Party leaders were indicted and convicted for conspiring to overthrow the US government by force or violence.

In some instances, the FBI’s only information came from the ultra-secret decrypts of Soviet communications from the VENONA project, which had to be protected.  Los Alamos physicist Ted Hall provides the best example of the FBI having a spy dead to rights, but not being able to arrest him because it needed to conceal its source.  If collateral information were available, as with the Rosenbergs, then prosecution could go ahead. [4]  Most of the Bureau’s dilemma was of its own making; the problem was less one of compromising sensitive sources than of having to disclose that the incriminating information on which a case hinged was acquired illegally.  In short, improper methods impeded law enforcement; investigatory means took control of justiciary ends.

Theoharis presents another reason why the FBI was better at catching criminals than at tracking spies.  Its “massive monitoring of the American Communist Party and other left-wing political and labor union organizations from the 1920s on . . . focused not on espionage but on Communist influence in American society.”  For example, a large program that targeted the Communist International apparatus in the United States showed that American communists advocated radical political, social, and economic change, and received money from their Soviet sponsors, but that very few committed espionage for Moscow.  Even when they had, they could not be prosecuted because the information against them was acquired illegally.  Most of the few “real spies” the FBI uncovered had stopped their clandestine work by the time they were caught, but the Bureau—trapped in another counterintelligence dilemma of never being able to prove the negative—kept investigating Soviet fronts, leftist organizations, and Stalin apologists in the off-chance that it might find a stray agent or two.

The reason for the FBI’s persistence, Theoharis writes, was political and ideological.  Hoover was more concerned with educating the American people about the “Red Menace” than about putting Soviet spies in jail. As depicted in Chasing Spies, Hoover was less a conservative anti-communist than a reactionary countersubversive. [5]   He passed on derogatory information about the radicals his agents had under surveillance to a network of ideological kinsmen in politics and journalism whom he cultivated assiduously.  Through FBI officials’ covert alliance with selected congressmen, congressional committees, and reporters and columnists, the Bureau had put itself in a win-win situation. [6]   It could hide its counterintelligence shortcomings behind a wall of secrecy and national security while Democratic administrations got blamed for not doing enough to stop Soviet espionage and communist subversion. [7]

Although Theoharis has compiled a troubling account of FBI abuses, he overstates the extent to which the Bureau still operates in Hoover’s shadow.  Potential targets of FBI counterterrorism investigations probably have more to fear from xenophobic vigilantes than from Bureau superpatriots.  Undoubtedly FBI agents will make mistakes, especially in the frenzy after a major attack, but the vast majority of its errors seem more likely to result from bureaucratic inertia, institutional culture clashes, outdated technology, and a steep learning curve than from any ideological fixation.

Theoharis did not set out to write a comprehensive history of FBI counterintelligence from the late 1930s to the mid-1950s, but his focus on the Soviet Union nonetheless leaves some important questions unanswered.  He could, for example, have usefully compared the Bureau’s anti-Soviet operations with its work against German, Japanese, and Italian spies and “fifth columnists” in the United States during World War II.  By all accounts, Hoover’s G-Men shut down Axis espionage and subversion networks quickly using traditional detective methods that led to prosecutions and convictions.  Why was the FBI more successful against those targets?  Why did it not have to use the same battery of illegal techniques against the fascists that it did against the communists?  Were the Axis nations’ operations run differently, or were the Soviets’ activities harder to uncover and interdict, or did the Bureau apply a double standard in dealing with the respective threats? 

Chasing Spies is much more effective at detailing the FBI’s transgressions than at dealing with the massive and incontrovertible evidence of Soviet espionage in America during the 1930s and 1940s that has accumulated in the past decade. [8]   Theoharis goes awry when he tries to find a historiographical peg on which to hang his latest research on the Bureau, which can stand well enough on its own.  In a semi-polemical preface, he takes some unwarranted shots at post-Cold War studies of Soviet spying that are based on VENONA decrypts and documents from KGB and Comintern archives.  (The GRU’s archives remain closed.) [9]   It is true that parts of this genre have a score-settling bite and a “we always told you so” smugness, and occasionally the writers overreach when interpreting vague or limited evidence.  Overall, however, they have demonstrated conclusively that Moscow had seeded the United States far and wide with spies and sympathizers whose theft of secrets and influence on policy damaged US national security, a conclusion that Theoharis himself actually shares. [10]   In counterpoint to this scholarship, some left-wing historians and what may be called “VENONA deniers” have accused the post-Cold War espionologists of flawed research and assorted political biases—“liberal anticommunism,” “right-wing triumphalism,” and, worst of all, “McCarthy rehabilitation.” [11]  

Theoharis accepts that the Americans so prominently accused of spying for Moscow—Alger Hiss, the Rosenbergs, et al.—were guilty.  He does not try to obscure the issue, as VENONA’s most dogged critic, Victor Navasky of The Nation, has by saying that they were “innocent of whatever it is people mean by espionage.” [12]   But some of his reasoning follows the general progression most VENONA deniers have undergone:  First, resist accepting that Americans did much spying for the Soviets; next, when presented with evidence that they did, carp at the details, stress any inconsistencies or ambiguities, and urge caution at reaching conclusions based on one source; finally, when shown corroboration for VENONA, claim “what’s new?” and argue that the spying had little effect on anything important.

This “so what?” argument—that Soviet spies did not steal much of value, so we should not have worried so much about them—is fallacious.  Besides assuming that the secrets stolen were not that valuable, the argument is flawed by ex post facto reasoning.  How could we have determined what damage Soviet agents caused without investigating them?  Even granting some of the “so what?” view, the deterrent effect that the US government’s counterintelligence work had must be taken into account.  If the Soviet espionage network had not been so badly disrupted by the late 1940s, future spies might have done much greater harm than those who got caught.

In attempting to discredit the work of the revisionists, Theoharis sometimes argues like a defense lawyer trying to keep incriminating evidence from a jury.  Especially when discussing some of the celebrated spy cases of the early Cold War—for example, Hiss, Elizabeth Bentley, and staff members of the journal Amerasia—he places more emphasis on the questionable means used to acquire the information than on what it reveals:  that the accused were guilty as charged.  Illegally obtained facts may not be admissible in court, but the Bureau’s methods and motives should not deter historians from using all information to reach their conclusions.  The evidentiary standards of legal proceedings and historical writing differ.

In the mid-1990s, ahead of the wave of books informed by VENONA and Soviet documents, historian Maurice Isserman wrote:  “That espionage has suddenly emerged as the key issue in the debate over American communism probably has as much to do with marketing strategy as with any reasoned historical analysis.” [13]   The voluminous new information on Soviet espionage in America before, during, and after World War II has disproved Isserman’s observation except to a dwindling band of ideological holdouts.  Theoharis, through his industrious mining of that and other material, now adds an important perspective on a troubling manifestation of official anti-communism in those years.  Chasing Spies offers a worthwhile admonition against politicized law enforcement and counterintelligence—and, in its few less scholarly moments, against politicized history, also.


Footnotes:

[1] Bill Miller, “Ashcroft:  Old Rules Aided Terrorists,” The Washington Post, 31 May 2002, p. A13; Edward P. Lazarus, “At the F.B.I., It’s Always Been Washington vs. the Field,” New York Times, 11 August 2002, sec. 4, p. 4.

[2] The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and the Patriot Act of 2001 expanded the FBI’s authority to use those techniques in counterintelligence investigations.  The US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review affirmed the Bureau’s powers in a November 2002 decision.

[3] Chasing Spies, p. 140.

[4] This dilemma has been well described in what remains the best book on the FBI and counterintelligence:  Robert Lamphere and Tom Shachtman, The FBI-KGB War (New York, NY:  Random House, 1986).

[5] Theoharis’s portrayal of Hoover resembles that by Richard Gid Powers in Secrecy and Power:  The Life of J. Edgar Hoover (New York, NY:  The Free Press, 1987) and Not Without Honor:  The History of American Anticommunism (New York:  The Free Press, 1995).

[6] Chasing Spies, p. 198.

[7] On the last point, Theoharis asks, “Did President Roosevelt’s indifference make possible Soviet espionage, and did President Truman’s partisanship or indifference foreclose FBI investigations of Soviet espionage activities that could have ensured the prosecution of guilty spies?” He answers both questions, “No.”

 (Ibid., p. 33.)

[8] In this respect, Theoharis’s book is an FBI-centered case study that complements Ellen Schrecker’s more expansive treatment of official anti-communism during the “Second Red Scare” of 1945-1955, Many Are the Crimes:  McCarthyism in America (Boston, MA:  Little, Brown, 1998).

[9] Major works in this group include:  Joseph Albright and Marcia Kunstel Albright, Bombshell:  The Secret Story of America’s Unknown Atomic Spy Conspiracy (New York, NY:  Times Books, 1997); Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield:  The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York, NY:  Basic Books, 1999); Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner, Venona:  Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957 (Washington, DC:  National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency, 1996); John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, VENONA:  Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1999); Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, The Secret World of American Communism (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1995); Kathryn S. Olmsted, Red Spy Queen:  A Biography of Elizabeth Bentley (Chapel Hill, NC:  University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, The Rosenberg File:  A Search for the Truth, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1997); Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel, The Venona Secrets:  Exposing Soviet Espionage and America’s Traitors (Washington, DC:  Regnery, 2000); Jerrold and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets:  How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History (Washington, DC:  Brassey’s, 2002); Sam Tanenhaus, Whittaker Chambers (New York, NY:  Random House, 1997); Allen Weinstein, Perjury:  The Hiss-Chambers Case (New York, NY:  Random House, 1997); Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood:  Soviet Espionage in America—The Stalin Era (New York, NY: Random House, 1999); and Nigel West, VENONA:  The Greatest Secret of the Cold War (London:  Harper Collins, 1999).

[10] Useful evaluations of the above-cited literature are:  John Earle Haynes, “The Cold War Debate Continues:  A Traditionalist View of Historical Writing on Domestic Communism and Anti-Communism,” Journal of Cold War Studies, 2:1 (Winter 2000), pp. 94-113; Hayden Peake, “The VENONA Progeny,” Naval War College Review, 53:3 (Summer 2000), pp. 195-206; Thomas Powers, “The Plot Thickens,” The New York Review of Books, 11 May 2000, pp. 53-58; and Jacob Weisberg, “Cold War Without End,” New York Times Magazine, 28 November 1999, <www.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/19991128mag-weisberg.html >.

[11] The Nation has been the principal venue for criticism of the new history on Soviet espionage; see, e.g., Ellen Schrecker and Maurice Isserman, “The Right’s Cold War Revision:  Current Espionage Fears Have Given New Life to Liberal Anticommunism,” 271:4 (24 July 2000), pp. 22ff; and Victor S. Navasky, “Cold War Ghosts:  The Case of the Missing Red Menace,” 273:3 (16 July 2001), pp. 36ff.

[12] Quoted in Weisberg, “Cold War Without End.”

[13] Ibid.


David Robarge is a member of CIA’s History Staff.

Posted at 11:30 pm by Psychomike
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Sunday, November 14, 2004
Osama Prepares Nuclear Strike Against U.S.

Why do I think the following is true? Well, some Middle Easterners said it was wrong to do the 911 attack- without warning America first so they had time to convert to the Moslem faith. Laden went to a religious leader and asked if he could use WMD against the U.S.- he was told that was fine if the American people had been warned. We have been. First when Al Qaeda websites said blue states would be safe but red ones would be attacked, then Laden released a tape also warning people. They have given us what they think are fair warnings.  
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,1101041122-782068,00.html=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,1101041122-782068,00.html  
 
Sunday, Nov. 14, 2004  
Bordering On Nukes?  
New accounts from al-Qaeda to attack the U.S. with weapons of mass destruction  
By ADAM ZAGORIN  
Try 4 Issues of TIME magazine FREE!  
A key al-Qaeda operative seized in Pakistan recently offered an alarming account of the group's potential plans to target the U.S. with weapons of mass destruction, senior U.S. security officials tell TIME. Sharif al-Masri, an Egyptian who was captured in late August near Pakistan's border with Iran and Afghanistan, has told his interrogators of "al-Qaeda's interest in moving nuclear materials from Europe to either the U.S. or Mexico," according to a report circulating among U.S. government officials.  
 
Masri also said al-Qaeda has considered plans to "smuggle nuclear materials to Mexico, then operatives would carry material into the U.S.," according to the report, parts of which were read to TIME. Masri says his family, seeking refuge from al-Qaeda hunters, is now in Iran.  
 
Masri's account, though unproved, has added to already heightened U.S. concerns about Mexico. Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge met publicly with top Mexican officials last week to discuss border security and smuggling rings that could be used to slip al-Qaeda terrorists into the country. Weeks prior to Ridge's lightning visit, U.S. and Mexican intelligence conferred about reports from several al-Qaeda detainees indicating the potential use of Mexico as a staging area "to acquire end-stage chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material." U.S. officials have begun to keep a closer eye on heavy-truck traffic across the border. The Mexicans will also focus on flight schools and aviation facilities on their side of the frontier. And another episode has some senior U.S. officials worried: the theft of a crop-duster aircraft south of San Diego, apparently by three men from southern Mexico who assaulted a watchman and then flew off in a southerly direction. Though the theft's connection to terrorism remains unclear, a senior U.S. law-enforcement official notes that crop dusters can be used to disperse toxic substances. The plane, stolen at night two weeks ago, has not been recovered.  
 
 
With reporting by Syed Talat Hussain  

Posted at 10:58 am by Psychomike
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Secrets Of History: Who Started McCarthy Era?

One of our more popular features here are the SECRETS OF WAR posts. With this post we tackle a historical myth, the McCarthy era, and over this coming week you'll find out more on this subject and also what I believe to be the truth from a source no one will be able to deny. Although the review that follows my comments are told from a leftist bias, most likely not deliberate but taught, there are statements made I strongly disagree with. However, these misgivings will all be dealt with in upcoming posts. First some comments, followed by info on WASHINGTON GONE CRAZY.

When George Orwell wrote 1984, he had abandoned his leftward beliefs. His original title was 1948. It was a critique of the west during the war years and the ugly side of the left. In specific, the west's support of Stalin, the purges, the mass murders that went far beyond Hitler. (One of Stalin's last acts was a plan to send all Jews in Russia to Siberia to work in forced labor camps. Most historians believe that drove those around him to kill him).  
 
Nowhere has the left triumphed more in our society than in the telling of history. How many have been won over to leftist thinking on beliefs that bear no relation to facts? From the truth about Joe McCarthy, to supporting Stalin's spies and defenders while to this day condemning any of Hitler's (they still clearly support Stalin- they don't attack his supporters, plays,etc) they have made our history books worthless.  
 
In 1984 the left constantly changed events and actions. It does to this day. It's motives, to win people to it's side, may seem important enough to them to destroy our history. But if it is really true that we shouldn't forget history, what they have done is the most shameful legacy of the left.  
 
Michael J. Ybarra has written a book that will shock many. WASHINGTON GONE CRAZY is the story of Senator Pat McCarran. He was the man who not only started the red scare as it is known now, but he went much further than McCarthy ever did. He actually passed laws against them. McCarthy did not, and contrary to popular belief, McCarthy refused to support banning the Communist Party.  
 
Senator Pat McCarran, the man who started the communist hunt and set in place the strengths and weaknesses of the anti communist movement long before Joe McCarthy ever gave a speech-  
 
was a Democrat.  
 
When you begin to ask yourself how he could have been forgotten- the guy who started it all, when you go back to original sources as the hero in 1984 does- you will discover the truth. Perhaps this book will make others question, "the wisdom of the day".
From The Washington Post's Book World/washingtonpost.com
In July 1950, Stewart and Joseph Alsop, two of this city's social and political insiders, wrote an article titled "Why Has Washington Gone Crazy?" for the Saturday Evening Post. Two months later, one of President Truman's close advisers handed him a note warning that the country was "on the verge of hysteria." And the next month liberal Sen. Paul Douglas mused nervously to himself that "there seems to be a mood of near madness in the country."

Things were obviously getting a bit frenzied. For starters, the Soviets had figured out how to make an atomic bomb, China had gone communist, and at home politics were being whipped into a froth by charges and countercharges of "un-Americanism." Like most historians since then, the Alsops blamed much of the era's craziness on Sen. Joe McCarthy, who a few months earlier had launched his anti-communist smear campaign in Wheeling, W.Va., by brandishing a bogus list of "subversives" in the State Department.

But the causes of the hysteria were much more complex than that -- and began long before the term "McCarthyism" was first used in print (by Herblock in a 1950 Washington Post editorial cartoon). Looking back from half a century later, Michael J. Ybarra, a former staff writer for the Wall Street Journal, borrowed part of the Alsops' title for his richly researched, endlessly entertaining chronicle of what might have been the 20th century's most tragic, self-destructive politics. He traces the origins of the period's hysteria to "a conservative reaction" to the new deal fueled by "rural rancor toward urban elites, nativist dread of encroaching minorities, fundamentalist anxiety over the spread of secular values" and Jeffersonian scorn for a growing and activist government."

In Ybarra's telling, no one embodied these fears and antipathies more than Sen. Patrick McCarran, a Democrat from Nevada who wielded extraordinary influence as chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee. His corrupt, sometimes crazed, hopelessly reactionary career is the centerpiece of Ybarra's tale.

"Years before Joe McCarthy ever opened his mouth in public," writes Ybarra, "McCarran believed -- really believed -- that the Democratic Party was controlled by the Communists and that one mysterious person especially had managed to exert a malign influence that could be felt at the highest levels of government." He once told a friend, "If I . . . eventually find that one, I will have served my country well."

The senator's early years gave no hint of the direction his life would take. The son of illiterate Irish immigrants, he started out as a populist, the law partner of a socialist and a friend of the working class. Correctly viewed as an outsider in Nevada's feudal political circles, he had a painfully sluggish beginning in politics. Once elected as a Democrat, he maintained just enough party allegiance to keep federal boondoggles coming to Nevada. In 1944, he became chairman of the Judiciary Committee and thereby one of the most powerful men in Washington. Four of every 10 bills had to go through his committee. He also controlled the subcommittee handling budgets for the State and Justice departments.

He ruled like a sultan. One year he cut State Department funds by $20 million because it circulated Herblock cartoons ridiculing him. He used FBI agents as chauffeurs and tourist guides for his wife and five children. The senator was apparently too powerful to be indicted even though he clearly committed perjury when, despite wiretap evidence to the contrary, he repeatedly swore he had never dealt with mobster Bugsy Siegel. There were serious stories of McCarran's being paid off at fixed roulette tables for blocking a federal tax on gambling.

"From the oversized chair in the Judiciary Committee room," writes Ybarra, "McCarran ran a virtual government-in-opposition, even while his own party controlled the White House and both wings of the Capitol," and he used his power ruthlessly. He turned Truman's attorneys general into puppets, driving the president into such a rage that he declared Nevada was a meaningless "hell on earth" that "should never have been made a state." He had a point. McCarran represented the least populated state in the nation. He needed only a piddling 35,000 votes to be elected, yet Senate rules gave him the power to cripple major portions of the federal government and shred the Constitution.

Laws that McCarran wrote and pushed through Congress made it easy to fire federal employees without telling them why or giving them a way to appeal and set up concentration camps in this country for imprisoning left-wing dissidents during "emergencies." With the end of World War II, there were seven million Europeans homeless and adrift. McCarran considered all immigrants to be potential spies, and he hated Jews. Using the McCarran-Walters Immigration Act and his Internal Security Act of 1950 to tighten immigration, he limited the number of refugees to only half a million over a two-year period -- fewer than 10,000 were Jews.

In 1951 McCarran created the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee "to investigate subversive activities" and named himself chairman. Although the House Un-American Activities Committee got much more publicity, the SISS was a goon squad, "the most fearsome of the congressional investigating committees in mid-twentieth century America." In 1954, McCarran keeled over dead from a heart attack in the middle of a political gathering. Thousands, including seven conservative senators, were there for his funeral in Nevada and for the valedictory speeches that followed. Sen. Styles Bridges, who had been McCarran's point man in many a witch hunt, said: "Any person with a personality can acquire friends, but only great men with the characteristics of Pat McCarran acquire enemies. I admire him for a great many things, not the least of which was the cluster of enemies he had."

It was a rather large cluster. Perhaps speaking for it was a local reporter attending the same event. Ybarra tells us he grumbled, "McCarran was a son of a bitch alive and he's a son of a bitch dead."

Reviewed by Robert Sherrill
Copyright 2004, The Washington Post Co. All Rights Reserved.


From Booklist
The infamous Senator Joseph McCarthy served as the poster boy for America's anti-Communist crusade of the 1950s, but this long-overdue biography makes clear that the real force behind that crusade was the little-remembered Senator Patrick McCarran. In disturbing detail, Ybarra establishes that while the Wisconsin demagogue was capturing headlines, it was the implacable cold warrior from Nevada who--with much less fanfare--turned anti-Communist paranoia into harsh legislation and draconian public policy, thus chilling debate, abridging civil rights, and destroying careers. McCarran emerges as the man who forged the legislative and procedural weapons for fighting Communism, without which McCarthy could never have even started his legendary witch-hunt. Indeed, by scrutinizing the way postwar politics evolved before McCarthy stepped onto the stage, Ybarra shows readers how McCarran almost single-handedly turned the threat of Communist infiltration into the justification for a monomaniacal campaign, waged with both guile and fury. Though far from sympathetic with McCarran's objectives, Ybarra marvels at his skill in dominating Congress, defying Democratic and Republican presidents, and outmaneuvering senior bureaucrats. And unlike McCarthy, whose influence ended as soon as the Senate censured him in 1954, McCarran inscribed his politics of fear deep in America's public policy, leaving behind dubious laws still in force as late as the 1990s. An eye-opening portrait of a largely forgotten twentieth-century titan. Bryce Christensen
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Booklist
"An eye-opening portrait of a largely forgotten twentieth century titan."


Review
"Ybarra's book might become a classic of the biographical genre, given its awesome research, compelling narrative and fluid writing style."
- San Jose Mercury-News

A "richly researched, endlessly entertaining chronicle of what might have been the 20th century's most tragic, self-destructive politics."
- Robert Sherrill in the Washington Post

"This outstanding book will provide an excellent introduction to the turbulent 1940s and early 1950s in America." - Library Journal

"A brilliant new biography...McCarran was a complex man, and Ybarra captures that complexity." - Las Vegas Mercury

"(boxed, starred review) An eye-opening portrait of a largely forgotten twentieth century titan." - Booklist

"A Chilling testament to one well-placed man's destructive influence over foreign policy and domestic liberty. By favoring careful documentation over demonization, Ybarra's hefty account offers a welcome new prespective on the origins of the Cold War."
- Publishers Weekly

“A truly landmark study.” — Douglas Brinkley


Library Journal
"This outstanding book will provide an excellent introduction to the turbulent 1940s and early 1950s in America."


Los Angeles Times
"Thanks to Michael J. Ybarra's magisterial and beautifully written book, McCarran's disquieting place in our history is restored."


Robert Sherrill in the Washington Post
A "richly researched, endlessly entertaining chronicle of what might have been the 20th century's most tragic, self-destructive politics."


San Jose Mercury-News
"Ybarra's book might become a classic of the biographical genre, given its awesome research, compelling narrative and fluid writing style."


From the Inside Flap
IN THIS SWEEPING, monumental work of American history, journalist Michael J. Ybarra tells the story of Senator Pat McCarran’s extraordinary career for the first time, and he vividly re-creates a passionate era of politics that reshaped America and echoes to this day. Brilliantly researched and energetically written, Washington Gone Crazy makes a significant new contribution to our understanding of the United States in the twentieth century.
McCarran was one of the most shrewd and powerful — and vindictive — lawmakers ever to sit in Congress. Joe McCarthy gave his name to the cause of zealous anti-Communism, but it was McCarran, a lifelong Democrat, who actually wrote the laws, held the hearings, and bullied the State and Justice Departments into doing his bidding. McCarran was consumed with looking for Communists in Washington and his obsession almost consumed the country.
The son of illiterate Irish immigrants, McCarran was born in 1876 in Nevada, where he grew up to be a sheepherder who taught himself the law around the campfire, becoming a legendary defense attorney and judge. After struggling for years against the local Democratic political machine, McCarran rode Franklin Roosevelt’s landslide into the U.S. Senate in 1932 — and broke ranks with Roosevelt during the New Deal’s first week. But it was President Harry Truman who would become McCarran’s real nemesis. A master of parliamentary procedure, McCarran turned his Senate Judiciary Committee into a virtual government within the government. McCarran worked with J. Edgar Hoover to undermine the Truman Administration before McCarthy even got to Washington. He created the most far-reaching anti-sedition law ever enacted in America (the McCarran Internal Security Act), which filled Ellis Island with immigrants alleged to be subversives and set up concentration camps to hold suspected traitors in the case of a national emergency. McCarran’s Senate Internal Security Subcommittee cowed the State Department into sacrificing the careers of diplomats accused of helping the Communists take over China. McCarran virtually blackmailed more than one attorney general into carrying out his policies. From Capitol Hill to the United Nations, from union halls to Hollywood, McCarran’s wrath broke careers and lives and ultimately, in a self-destructive fit of pique, cost his party control of the Senate. Ybarra’s even-handed narrative shows that McCarran was ultimately half right: There really were Communists in Washington — but it was the hunt for them that did the real damage.

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/1586420658/102-1313641-4088929?v=glance

Posted at 09:02 am by Psychomike
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Saturday, November 13, 2004
Why Did Democrats Vote For Bush?

 
Tammy Bruce is a columnist and talk radio host. She was the youngest chair of the Los Angeles NOW chapter, and doubled their membership in one year. She describes herself as a lesbian by choice. Her website address follows this piece. When Bush won, he doubled the number of Blacks that voted for him. He increased his standing with women by a huge amount. Now we all know why the Republicans are trying to make immigration deals with Mexico- he swept Latino communities. Yet some, trying to blame the country rather than ask themselves why their candidate lost, blame religion. So why did so many registered Dermocrats vote for Bush? I think this piece, written before the election, is a far better explaination that blaming religion.
Why Democrats Should Vote for Bush
Tammy Bruce
Friday, Oct. 29, 2004
As a Democrat and a pro-choice feminist, it’s time for me to explain why I support the president, and why other thoughtful Democrats should join me in doing so.

I can’t tell you how many e-mails I’ve received from other Democrats either condemning me for not toeing the line, while others write who are genuinely curious, after all the hate-mongering and demonizing of Republicans and the president specifically, they hope I can ease their fears about what their inclination to vote for the president means about them.

The simple answer? It means you’re a confident liberal, a thoughtful person who realizes that game of party loyalty takes a back seat to the safety of your family and this nation.

It also means you take the slogans of “choice” and “radical individualism” seriously. Isn’t it ironic that there’s nothing more radically individual these days than a liberal who doesn’t conform?

For me, Authentic Feminism is rooted in making it possible for people to make the choices that best suit them.

If you have recognized the weakness of John Kerry, and know in your heart a vote for the president is the right thing to do, join me and do it! It can be done with a clear conscience as you embrace the radical individual inside you that attracted you to liberal causes in the first place.

Because some things simply transcend party lines, when in front of that Early Voting touch screen, I stood there as an American first, and voted for George W. Bush. This nation, our lives, and the lives our children require nothing less.

I explain to detractors and supporters alike that President Bush is the man who will keep this nation safest.

The president and I hold dramatically divergent views on a number of social issues of importance to me, and yet for the 3,000 people who died on September 11th, abortion rights and same-sex civil unions mean absolutely nothing to them now.

These issues, while important to me and ones on which I will continue to speak out about, are luxuries in the face of a world war where the enemy is a stateless savage who hunts children and cuts off people’s heads.

We have a responsibility to leave this nation as great as it is to the next generation.

We all know, and must reflect on, the fact that the joy we have in our lives today is due to the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of other Americans who died fighting for this country. Those soldiers did not die because they were promised 72 virgins in the afterlife, they fought not for themselves — they died in the most noble of American causes — so future generations — us — could live in freedom.

I do not take that action for granted, and I have learned that generosity of spirit and commitment to freedom is inherent in each of us, and a duty we cannot shirk.

Those of you with children have a more immediate concern, which is the literal safety of the light of your life.

That little face looks up at you as you tuck her in, and sleeps gently knowing that Mommy and Daddy are there.

That same face stares at you in the morning, with a heart full of hope, limited only by her imagination because you confront, for her, the harsh realities of every day. And these days it’s not just about making a living, it’s about the Beslan school massacre, it’s a new al-Qaida tape threatening Americans at home, it’s about war and mad savages who have specifically targeted children.

I voted for President Bush because having a Pacifist Internationalist in the White House will only embolden those who salivate at the sight of our blood.

Having a man in the White House who stands for nothing will only excite Islamic Fascists who revel in torture and the cutting off of heads. I do not want a man in the White House who is so cold, when asked by a New York Times reporter how September 11th changed him, answers “It didn’t change me much at all.”

While I know a Bush presidency makes my work as a feminist more complicated and demanding, I will love and be grateful for every day I have the luxury of working on those issues. And frankly, it’s not necessarily a bad thing to have a president who encourages social activism on issues.

Liberals make the mistake of thinking a Democrat president is indeed Daddy, who can be trusted in all things. Apathy soon follows that false comfort.

Bill Clinton showed us the decline of the Democratic Party into a gang spouting slogans to make women, gays and blacks feel Daddy was in the house, to our grave regret. What did we get? A sexual compulsive who put Monica Lewinsky on her knees instead of cutting bin Laden off at his.

Yes, there were plenty of Democrats, feminists, gays and blacks in the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and on those fateful flights. I’m sure you would agree that in their last moments their literal lives were more important to them than party affiliation.

I want a president who will be strongest making sure tomorrow comes, that this nation not just survives, but emerges from this war like the others we have fought, in a world that has been transformed for the better. I want a president who understands this is war, not a “nuisance.”

I know George Bush has made many in the world angry, and frankly, I am dismayed at the hard feelings. A recent poll of Europeans revealed their general belief that Bush has made the world a more dangerous place.

Upon hearing that, I remind myself of the time President Reagan increased arms production and installed more Pershing Missiles in Europe as we faced down the Soviet Union.

President Reagan grappled with European polls, anger and resentment, all of which evaporated when the Soviet regime collapsed.

Yes, they hated Reagan, but he plodded on, never swayed by those polls or made doubtful by others’ hatred. His resolve freed Europe from the shadow of a bear which had no mercy and the blood of tens of millions on its paws.

As a man of faith with a love of this country, Reagan stayed the course, and did what he knew had to be done. He was a leader, and I’m proud to say, one that only America could deliver.

Today, President Bush faces the same polls, the same anger, and the same resentment as he, too, recognizes and engages a rabid enemy of civilization, Islamo-Fascists.

Europeans felt Reagan was leading them to Armageddon, as they now insist Bush is doing. We can’t know what it’s like for Europeans to see such a young nation doing so many things, but one thing Europe will find, again, is that while we may be wild, young and even cowboys on occasion, we have a pretty good track record of making the world a safer and better place.

With George W. Bush at the helm, this time will be no different.

I voted for President Bush because he has freed 50 million people, 25 million of which are women and girls. The feminist establishment, in a shameful exhibit of their hypocrisy, has ignored that fact.

As a feminist, I thank the president with my vote, in solidarity with the millions of Afghan and Iraqi women who now, courtesy of the president and our astounding military, finally have hope, liberty and freedom.

Like all of our presidents, George W. Bush is quintessentially an American. He’s a Cowboy. A Texan. He will never be mistaken for a Frenchman. He’s a Yalie. He’s a man of faith, a husband and father. He’s a man who has fought with and overcome addiction. He’s a man of strength and character.

And while he is also wrong on some issues, if I have to work harder on social issues, I want it to be against a man whom I can admire, who I know, despite our disagreements, honors me in his work to keep this nation free and great.

For those of you who are Democrats and liberals — and I know through my years as a leader in left wing causes, including feminist and gay activism — we all have gone through a sort of conditioning that makes dissent or difference a frightening prospect.

Republicans and conservatives have been decidedly demonized in your circle—perhaps by your own friends and family.

Let me tell you this - voting for the President does not change who you are or what you stand for. I stand for the classical liberal concepts of personal liberty and individualism, and have spent a great deal of my adult life working for those causes. I have found that “Choice” and “Individualism” are only slogans if you never act on them. Sometimes being yourself means straying from the expected, standing apart from your crowd.

November 2nd is a good a day to be a Democrat who’s an American first.

For more information please visit www.tammybruce.com

Posted at 08:10 pm by Psychomike
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Thursday, November 11, 2004
Don't Blame Jesus For The Election!

QUESTION:

It's just hard to imagine that Americans love living under the spectre of constant fear, love the only President to presided over a major terrorist attack on America soil, love a President that has LOST jobs on his watch, love a weak economy, love a poorly ran war, love freedom limiting legistlation.  
 
There has to be another reason.

ANSWER: 

Well there are lot's of reasons.  
 
Way back at the start I said that calling Bush Hitler was a huge mistake. There are plenty of polls that show negative attacks can reach a backlash level.  
 
I said that ignoring the South was a huge mistake.  
 
I mocked polls by saying a football game's outcome was more important than any poll. Turned out, I was right on both counts. Both outcomes were equally wrong.  
 
I said that Kerry had failed to define himself.  
 
But it didn't matter to my Democratic friends. They couldn't even hear themselves. They never said why Kerry was better. In fact, many said he was lame! They had only one reason to vote for Kerry. They hated Bush. And I have said and written over and over that this was not a reason at all.  
 
This is the time for Democrats to ask themselves what they think they screwed up on. Yet the vast majority, like Kerry's wife barely being able to hide her contempt of the masses, can't do it.  
 
You see, his wife and the left have something in common. They love the romantic image of the poor. The workers. But they hate the actual reality of that group. The left will attack police and throw bricks through STARBUCKS windows yelling that jobs have left for Asia and Mexico. But if those same states don't buy what they are selling at election time the workers are stupid, they have low IQ's, they should be kicked out of the country,they are too religious, they are garbage.  
 
The Democrats traded away labor for mobsters and celebrities a long time ago.  
 
The Democratic Party fooled you hook, line and sinker. How does it feel to have thrown your vote away? You could have made it mean something. If Nader had gotten 3 or 4% more votes than last time he might have landed in a debate next time. We need a third party. Even I say we need to drop the electoral college. Why can't we vote on Saturday instead of a week day?  
 
So instead the Democrats call the people witches. Idiots. Fanatics. Keep that attitude up. For at least three years. The election map, which looks the same as the time before, will look the same a third time. Do you think they can't hear or read you folks saying this stuff?  
 
What kind of ego does it take to think you lost a match, but did nothing wrong?

This is a good article:
 
Myths of the Republican Mullah-cracy
You can't blame Jesus for the voters' choice



It took only a few hours for media talking heads to come up with an explanation for why the tax-cutting, war-mongering ignoramus George W. Bush got re-elected on Tuesday. It couldn't have been, they agreed, that the electorate truly wanted four more years of Republican domestic and foreign policies. After all, didn't John Kerry win every substantive point on the issues that really matter? Wasn't Bush an accidental, illegitimate president in the first place? Another explanation had to be found.

Quickly scanning the exit polling, pundits spotted that 22 percent of voters had said "moral issues" were the most important in the race, and they broke heavily for Bush. A-ha! Now they had a talking point: evil mastermind Karl Rove had used the same-sex marriage issue to turn out so many religious conservatives that they overwhelmed everyone's likely-voter models and became a disproportionate share of the 2004 electorate.

The initially unspoken, but soon loudly proclaimed, implication of this fact was that Bush and the Republicans had bamboozled these voters, whose real economic interests lay with the Democrats. They didn't truly support Bush on substantive domestic and foreign-policy issues. They were just anti-gay bigots. As the spin got more frenzied Wednesday and Thursday, words like "jihadis" and "mullahs" got attached to these deluded and dangerous Bush voters, whom Democrats and sympathetic analysts described as something akin to a bizarre and perversely fascinating lost tribe just discovered in the rain forests of Borneo. By weekend, an inevitable backlash against the frenzy had set in.

The problem with all this is that, while comforting to many Kerry supporters and exhilarating for some social-conservative leaders, the notion that Bush won primarily because religious voters turned out for him does not seem to be backed up by any real evidence. Few reporters or commentators appear to have gone back to examine the 2000 exit polls, which would seem to be necessary if one wishes to assert a trend.

I did. I found that the percentage of voters sampled who said they attended church at least weekly was the same—42 percent—in both 2000 and 2004. The percentage never attending church was also the same, at 15 percent. The middle group, those attending occasionally, was, you guessed it, 42 percent each time. Interestingly, while Bush slightly improved his standing among frequent churchgoers, by about a point in 2004, his support grew by 3 to 4 points among those attending seldom or never.

Yep, it was the atheist vote that really put Bush over the top in 2004.

There could be other ways to salvage the myth of the Republican mullah-cracy. For example, one might argue that it is unfair to equate church-going with religiosity or cultural conservatism.

Another potential proof: More people identified themselves as conservatives in 2004 (34 percent) than in 2000 (29 percent). But there are all kinds of conservatives, including quite a few who are socially conservative and hawkish and in favor of privatizing Social Security. Sorry, this doesn't prove anything other than people are increasingly willing to label themselves as conservative rather than moderate.

OK, what about issue positions? In 2000, about 40 percent of voters in the exit poll said that abortion should be mostly or always illegal. In 2004, it was 42 percent. Not exactly a huge jump. And we don't know how many of those are single-issue voters on abortion. Both parties have significant minorities who disagree with the official party position: about a quarter of pro-lifers voted for Kerry, while around one-third of pro-choicers picked Bush. On same-sex marriage, the issue was not polled in 2000 so it is impossible to say with certainty how the two electorates compare, but it is unlikely that this year's voters were significantly more conservative on it. In fact, the public's position is more nuanced here than the insta-spin would have you believe. About as many favored civil unions but not official marriage (35 percent) as favored neither (37 percent), and Bush was preferred by both groups over Kerry.

Well, perhaps there was no national trend but it happened in selected states such as Ohio. Nope. In the 2000 exit poll for Ohio, the percentage of frequent churchgoers was higher (45 percent) than in 2004 (40 percent). Bush did win a larger majority of religious Ohio voters in 2004 than he did four years ago, but there were fewer of them proportionally. Besides, saying that the religious-vote affect mattered in a few key states changes the nature of the media spin, which has been trying to assert it as a sweeping national "explanation" for Bush's popular vote.

That leaves the initial assertion about 22 percent of voters citing moral issues as most important, higher than the share citing terrorism, Iraq, the economy, or other issues. When I looked more closely at this question, however, doubts immediately presented themselves. For one thing, the answers were broken out in ways that biased the analysis. While the poll did not attempt to distinguish the various moral issues that voters might be thinking about—abortion, marriage, wars for oil, etc.—it did list "taxes" and "the economy" separately, as well as "terrorism" and "Iraq." Of course, for many voters, these are not separate issues. You may disagree with them, but most voters sampled in the exit poll said that the war in Iraq was part of the overall war on terrorism. And many right-leaning voters see tax policy as inextricably linked with economic growth and job creation (at least a few freedom-loving folks even see tax cuts as a moral issue—imagine that!)

In short, the question is flawed and the answers easily misunderstood. Moreover, it doesn't compare well with the 2000 exit poll, in which "moral issues" was not listed as an option. On the other hand, you can track the impact of foreign policy over time. In 2000, only 12 percent said that "foreign affairs" was the most important issue in the presidential race, and they broke 54 percent to 40 percent for Bush over Gore. In 2004, a combined 34 percent identified foreign policy (either Iraq or the war on terrorism) as the most important, and they appear to have broken for Bush by 59 percent to 40 percent. Put it all together, and the increase in salience and small increase in Bush preference for foreign policy constitutes a gain of 13.5 percentage points in the Bush vote in 2004.

Obviously, he didn't win by that much. He lost ground on economic issues, because of the recession. But without his edge on war on terrorism, Bush would have lost. And that proposition—unlike the "it's all about gay marriage meme"—is testable and fits the available data. Voters worried about partial-birth abortion, same-sex marriage, and other cultural issues are obviously an important constituency within the current GOP majority, but they are no more responsible for Bush's national victory on Tuesday than voters motivated by other issues to re-elect the president.


John Hood is president of the John Locke Foundation, a public policy think tank in North Carolina, and a syndicated columnist and radio host.

http://www.reason.com/hod/jh110804.shtml

Posted at 11:38 am by Psychomike
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Wednesday, November 10, 2004
Arafat Has Passed

Think Again: Yasir Arafat

By Dennis B. Ross

In 1974, Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), declared before the United Nations that he came “bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter’s gun.” Nearly 20 years later, the world still does not know if Arafat is a statesman dedicated to peaceful coexistence with Israel or a resistance leader dedicated to armed struggle. As the Israeli-Palestinian conflict enters a tenuous new phase of peace negotiations, understanding Arafat’s true motives will be essential to fostering a lasting agreement.



“Arafat’s Goal Is a Lasting Peace With the State of Israel”

I doubt it. Throughout the Oslo peace process, everyone involved—Palestinians, Israelis, Americans, Egyptians, Saudis, and other Arab leaders—shared the belief that Arafat wanted peace with Israel. It seemed logical. After all, Arafat had crossed the threshold and recognized Israel, incurring the wrath of secular and religious rejectionists. And he had authorized five limited or interim agreements with the Israelis. Although Arafat held out until the last possible minute and strived for the best deal, he eventually made the compromises necessary to reach those interim agreements.

Unfortunately, such short-term progress masked some disquieting signals about the Palestinian leader’s intentions. Every agreement he made was limited and contained nothing he regarded as irrevocable. He was not, in his eyes, required to surrender any claims. Worse, notwithstanding his commitment to renounce violence, he has never relinquished the terror card. Moreover, he is always quick to exaggerate his achievements, even while maintaining an ongoing sense of grievance. During the Oslo peace process, he never prepared his public for compromise. Instead, he led the Palestinians to believe the peace process would produce everything they ever wanted—and he implicitly suggested a return to armed struggle if negotiations fell short of those unattainable goals. Even in good times, Arafat spoke to Palestinian groups about how the struggle, the jihad, would lead them to Jerusalem. Too often his partners in the peace process dismissed this behavior as Arafat being caught up in rhetorical flourishes in front of his “party” faithful. I myself pressed him when his language went too far or provoked an angry Israeli response, but his stock answer was that he was just talking about the importance of struggling for rights through the negotiation process.

But from the start of the Oslo negotiations in 1993, Arafat focused only on what he was going to receive, not what he had to give. He found it difficult to live without a cause, a struggle, a grievance, and a conflict to define him. Arafat never faced up to what he would have to do—even though we tried repeatedly to condition him. As a result, when he was finally put to the test with former President Bill Clinton’s proposal in December 2000, Arafat failed miserably.

Is there any sign that Arafat has changed and is ready to make historic decisions for peace? I see no indication of it. Even his sudden readiness to seize the mantle of reform is the result of intense pressure from Palestinians and the international community. He is maneuvering now to avoid real reform, not to implement it. And on peace, he does not appear ready to acknowledge the opportunity that existed with Clinton’s plan, nor does he seem willing to confront the myths of the Palestinian movement.


“Arafat Missed a Historic Opportunity When He Turned Down the Clinton Proposal”

Yes. It is true that Arafat did not “reject” the ideas the Clinton administration offered in December 2000. Instead, he pulled a classic Arafat: He did not say yes or no. He wanted it both ways. He wanted to keep talking as if the Clinton proposal was the opening gambit in a negotiation, but he knew otherwise. Arafat knew Clinton’s plan represented the culmination of the American effort. He also knew these ideas were offered as the best judgment of what each side could live with and that the proposal would be withdrawn if not accepted.

To this day, Arafat has never honestly admitted what was offered to the Palestinians—a deal that would have resulted in a Palestinian state, with territory in over 97 percent of the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem; with Arab East Jerusalem as the capital of that state (including the holy place of the Haram al-Sharif, the Noble Sanctuary); with an international presence in place of the Israeli Defense Force in the Jordan Valley; and with the unlimited right of return for Palestinian refugees to their state but not to Israel. Nonetheless, Arafat continues to hide behind the canard that he was offered Bantustans—a reference to the geographically isolated black homelands created by the apartheid-era South African government. Yet with 97 percent of the territory in Palestinian hands, there would have been no cantons. Palestinian areas would not have been isolated or surrounded. There would have been territorial integrity and contiguity in both the West Bank and Gaza, and there would have been independent borders with Egypt and Jordan.

“The offer was never written” is a refrain uttered time and again by apologists for Chairman Arafat as a way of suggesting that no real offer existed and that therefore Arafat did not miss a historic opportunity. Nothing could be more ridiculous or misleading. President Clinton himself presented both sides with his proposal word by word. I stayed behind to be certain both sides had recorded each word accurately. Given Arafat’s negotiating style, Clinton was not about to formalize the proposal, making it easier for Arafat to use the final offer as just a jumping-off point for more ceaseless bargaining in the future.

However, it is worth pondering how Palestinians would have reacted to a public presentation of Clinton’s plan. Had Palestinians honestly known what Arafat was unwilling to accept, would they have supported violence against the Israelis, particularly given the suffering imposed on them? Would Arafat have remained the “only Palestinian” capable of making peace? Perhaps such domestic pressure would have convinced Arafat, the quintessential survivor, that the political costs of intransigence would be higher than the costs of making difficult concessions to Israel.


“Arab Leaders Stand Behind Arafat”

Reluctantly. I have never met an Arab leader who trusts Arafat or has anything good to say about him in private. Almost all Arab leaders have stories about how he has misled or betrayed them. Most simply wave their hands dismissively when examples of his betrayal of commitments are cited—almost as if they are saying, “We know, we know.” The Saudis, in particular, saw his alignment with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in 1991 as proof of his perfidy.

But no Arab leader is prepared to challenge him. All acknowledge him as the symbol of the Palestinian movement, and no one sees an alternative to him. But no one is prepared to go out on a limb for him, either.

Many suggest that in the absence of broad Arab support, Clinton’s proposal was too hard for Arafat to accept. Furthermore, some argue, since the United States failed to secure the support Arafat needed, it bears some responsibility for his inability to say yes. That argument is more myth than reality. First, if Clinton’s offer was so hard to accept, why has Arafat never honestly portrayed it? Why not say he was offered 97 percent, instead of Bantustans or cantons? Why not admit he would have had Arab East Jerusalem as the capital of the state, instead of denying that?

Second, we did line up the support of five key Arab leaders for Clinton’s plan. On December 23, 2000, the same day that President Clinton presented his ideas to Israeli and Palestinian negotiators, he called Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, and Jordanian King Abdullah II to convey the comprehensive proposal he had just presented to the parties. Shortly thereafter, he also transmitted the ideas to King Mohammed IV of Morocco and President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia. All these Arab leaders made clear they thought Clinton’s ideas were historic, and they pledged to press Arafat to accept the plan. However, when Arafat told Arab leaders he had questions, they backed off and assumed the position they had adopted throughout the Oslo peace process. They would support whatever Chairman Arafat accepted. They were not about to put themselves in a position in which Arafat might claim that President Mubarak or Crown Prince Abdullah or King Abdullah was trying to pressure him to surrender Palestinian rights.

There is a lesson here for today: Getting Arab leaders to fulfill their responsibilities—to be participants and not just observers—is essential. On existential questions in which concessions on the Palestinian side are required, Arab leaders will likely restrict their pressure to private entreaties. But that is not where real leverage is to be found. Pressure in public would be pressure as Arafat defines it. Arafat’s great achievement for the Palestinians has been putting them on the map, producing recognition, giving them standing on the world stage. He embodies the cause, and that is why Arab leaders find it so hard to criticize him in public. Yet he cannot afford the imagery that he and the Palestinian cause are separate. If Arab leaders would say that his being only a symbol and not a leader threatens Palestinian interests, then Arafat’s very identity would be called into question. That would move him.

“The World Must Deal With Arafat Since He Is the Palestinians’ Elected Leader”

Not necessarily. The United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations have adopted this position. An election in the territories in 1996 made Arafat the chairman of the Palestinian Authority. But the international community does the Palestinians no favor when it emphasizes Arafat’s popular election as justification for dealing with him. It is important to remember that anger on Palestinian streets before the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada was directed against Israel and also against the corruption and ineptitude of the Palestinian Authority. Now that the dust is settling after Israeli military operations and massive reconstruction is needed in the West Bank,
Palestinians are demanding reform. They are demanding elections, rule of law, an independent judiciary, transparency, accountability, streamlined security services governed by standards (not by Arafat’s whims), and an end to corruption.

Palestinians are not looking to oust Chairman Arafat. They simply want to limit his arbitrary use of power. Given the pressure he is under (from within, from among Arabs to stop manipulating violence and to assume responsibility, and from the international community), it is not hard to see why Arafat is trying to seize the mantle of reform. Yet he cannot be permitted to speak of reform and at the same time avoid its consequences. Otherwise, the momentum will be lost. True reform is an essential part of any political process designed to promote peace. The more serious the reform, the more the Israeli public will see that Palestinian behavior is changing—and the more likely Israel will accept the possibility of partnership again. If Arafat is allowed to escape pressure for genuine reform, the Israeli government will be under no pressure to resume political negotiations.

One could argue that the world must deal with Arafat because he is the symbol of the Palestinian movement, because he is the only address available, and because he is the only one who can be held responsible for Palestinian behavior. That would be a more honest explanation than saying he is the popularly elected leader of the Palestinians. However, Arafat’s role as a symbol is not the reason the U.S. government recognized him in the first place. The United States made the decision to deal directly with Arafat in September 1993 when, as part of the Oslo documents, he formally agreed to renounce terror, to discipline and punish any Palestinian violators of that pledge, and to settle all disputes peacefully. Suffice to say, Arafat has not abided by those commitments.

No one but the Palestinians can choose the Palestinian leader. But the rest of the world can choose not to deal with a leader who fails to fulfill obligations. Governments can tell the Palestinian public they recognize it has legitimate aspirations that must be addressed and that those aspirations can only be addressed politically, not militarily. But those aspirations will not be satisfied until Palestinians have a leadership—whether it is Arafat, a successor, or a collective body that limits the chairman’s power—that will fulfill its responsibilities on security and declare that suicide bombers are enemies of the Palestinian cause. When a Palestinian leadership lives up to those commitments, the Palestinians and the Arab world will have an American partner determined to help ensure that Palestinian needs are met.


“Arafat Can’t Control the Militants in the Palestinian Authority”

He can, but he won’t. Arafat has demonstrated in the past that he can prevent violence—most notably in the spring of 1996 when he cracked down on Hamas and also in the first year of former Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s administration, when Israel, for the only time in its history, had a year in which it did not suffer a single fatality from terror.

Yet from the beginning of the peace process, Arafat made clear he prefers to co-opt, not confront, extremist groups. This approach reflects his leadership style: He never closes doors. He never forecloses options. He never knows when he might want to have a particular group, no matter what its ideology or purpose, on his side. This strategy has certainly been true of his dealings with Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In 1996, he suppressed extremists because they were threatening his power, not because they carried out four suicide bombings in Israel in nine days. Even then, the crackdown, while real, was limited. Arafat did not completely shut the door on either group.

In the past, whenever Arafat cracked down or threatened to do so, the militants backed down. But that stopped in September 2000 with the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Those who say Arafat cannot carry out his security responsibilities because Israeli military incursions have devastated his capabilities fail to recognize that Arafat didn’t act even before Israelis destroyed his infrastructure. In the 20 months leading up to May 2002, he never gave unequivocal orders to arrest, much less stop, those who were planning, organizing, recruiting, financing, or implementing terror attacks against Israelis. Whether one thinks—as the Israelis believe recently captured documents demonstrate—Arafat directs the violence or that he simply acquiesces to it, the unmistakable fact is that he has made no serious or sustained effort to stop the violence.

If nothing else, it is time for Arafat to use his moral authority to make clear that armed struggle only threatens the Palestinian cause—that those who persist in the violence are not martyrs but enemies of Palestinian interests and needs. Let him make such declarations consistently, rather than repeating the pattern of the past as when he called for a cease-fire on December 16, 2001, only to call for a million martyrs to march on Jerusalem shortly thereafter. Pressing Arafat to speak out consistently does not relieve him of the need to act. Nor does it relieve the Israelis of finding a way to meet their legitimate security needs without making the Palestinians suffer. Ultimately, keeping the territories under siege is self-defeating. This approach only fosters anger and a desire to make Israelis feel comparable pain. The Israeli military has succeeded in creating a necessary respite from terrorist attacks. Now Israel should seek a political path that builds on that respite and gives Palestinians an interest in making it more enduring.


“The Time Has Come to Impose a Peace Deal on Arafat and Sharon”

Absolutely not. Nearly two years of conflict, the spiraling violence, the deepening sense of gloom, and the seeming inability of the two sides to do anything on their own give credence to the argument that now is the time to impose a solution. If an imposed solution were possible and would hold, I would be prepared to support it. But an imposed solution is an illusion.

No Israeli government (not Ariel Sharon’s, not Ehud Barak’s, not Benjamin Netanyahu’s, not Shimon Peres’s) has accepted or will accept an imposed outcome. It goes against the Israeli ethos that a partner for peace must prove its commitment by directly negotiating an agreement. Paradoxically, the very terms Israeli governments might find difficult to accept if imposed would probably be acceptable if Israelis believed they had a real partner for peace. Those who argue for an imposed solution claim no Israeli leader can make the hard decisions, such as giving up settlements, most of the West Bank and Gaza, and the Arab part of East Jerusalem. Yet Barak was prepared to do so; and before the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israeli public was ready to support him. In a recent trip to Israel, I found a far-reaching consensus—encompassing the left and the right in Israel—for acceptance of a Clinton-like solution, provided the Palestinians are truly prepared to forsake terror, violence, and the right of return to Israel.

Trying to impose a solution that the Israeli government will not accept—and the Sharon government will surely not accept Clintonesque ideas in the current environment—will only result in strong resistance. Even if the United States could pressure the Israelis to reluctantly accept an imposed outcome, would it endure? I doubt it.

Arafat would certainly go along with an imposed outcome. He has always preferred such an option. It would relieve him of the responsibility to make a decision. He can outwardly acquiesce, saying he has no choice. But inevitably, Palestinians will oppose at least part of an imposed outcome. Will new issues—what we might call Palestinian “Sheba farms”—suddenly emerge? Recall that Israel withdrew from Lebanon in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 425 and that the U.N. secretary-general certified this withdrawal. Yet Hezbollah now claims that the Sheba farms area of the Golan Heights is Lebanese and that lasting “Israeli occupation” justifies continued armed resistance, including Katyusha rocket attacks. Will there not be a Palestinian equivalent of this situation after an imposed solution? And given Arafat’s poor track record, how can anyone expect he would defend the existing peace agreement against such newly discovered grievances?

If one overriding lesson from the past persists, it is that the Palestinians must make decisions and bear the responsibility of those decisions. No enduring peace can be reached until the Palestinian leadership levels with its public, resists the temptation to blame every ill on the Israelis or the outside world, assumes responsibility for controversial decisions, and stands by its decision in the face of opposition.

An imposed solution will only delay the day when all sides, but especially the Palestinians, have to assume real responsibilities. Consequently, an imposed solution would be no solution at all.



Ambassador Dennis B. Ross is director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He was the lead negotiator on the Middle East peace process in the first Bush and both Clinton administrations.

Posted at 11:18 pm by Psychomike
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